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Resident and Nonresident Tuition 
and Enrollment at Flagship 
State Universities 
Michael J. Rizzo and Ronald G. Ehrenberg 
7.1 Introduction 
The recent economic downturn in the United States has led to severe 
current and projected budget deficits in most states. Sharp rises in 
health care costs and increased competition for state funds from other 
sources has concurrently led to a decrease in the shares of state budgets 
earmarked for the higher education sector.1 Because universities are able 
to attract revenue from other sources (e.g., tuition, annual giving, and 
federal student aid) and they are a discretionary component of most 
state budgets, they are often the first to go under the knife during tough 
times. The resulting revenue shortages from these budget cuts will most 
certainly have deleterious effects on college accessibility and on the be-
havior of these higher education institutions. Inasmuch as 65 percent of 
the 9.2 million students enrolled in four-year institutions in 1999 were 
enrolled in public institutions and in most states the major public re-
search universities are also the most selective in terms of admissions, it 
is important to understand institutional responses relating to tuition 
Michael J. Rizzo is assistant professor of economics at Centre College and a research as-
sistant at the Cornell Higher Education Research Institute (CHERI). Ronald G. Ehrenberg 
is the Irving M. Ives Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations and Economics at Cornell 
University, director of CHERI, and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER). Without implicating them for what remains, we are grateful to the Andrew 
W. Mellon Foundation and the Atlantic Philanthropies (USA) Inc. for their support of 
CHERI and to Michelle White, Caroline Hoxby, participants at the NBER conference, and 
two referees for their comments on earlier versions. 
1. From fiscal year (FY) 1992 to FY2002, the share of states' discretionary budgets allo-
cated to higher education has fallen 0.8 percentage points, from 13.5 percent to 12.7 percent. 
Health care's share has risen from 12.1 percent to 16.0 percent during this time. See National 
Association of State Budget Officers (2002). 
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and enrollment policies, as well as the likely changes in state grant aid 
policies. 
During the 1979 to 2000 period, the average state appropriation at the 
flagship public research institutions, as a share of total current fund rev-
enues at the institution, fell from 42 percent to 31 percent. Only ten insti-
tutions saw increases in the share of their revenues coming from state ap-
propriations over this period, and only three of these saw any increase in 
the share during the 1988 to 2000 period. 
To make up for this revenue shortfall, public institutions can increase their 
undergraduate tuition revenues in two ways.2 First, they may increase the tu-
ition level they charge in-state students; however, this is often a politically 
unpopular move. Second, because all public research institutions charge a 
higher tuition to out-of-state students than they do to in-state students, they 
can raise the tuition level they charge out-of-state students and/or adjust the 
composition of their student body by enrolling more out-of-state students. 
Adjusting the share of students that come from out-of-state is at best a 
short-run solution and for political reasons may be much less easily ad-
justed than the out-of-state student tuition level. After some point, it may 
be politically very difficult to further expand the share of out-of-state stu-
dents, while state officials may not be concerned about charging nonresi-
dent students increasingly higher rates of tuition. The political difficulties 
arise because enrolling more nonresidents may preclude qualified students 
from one's own state from attending the flagship public university in the 
state. On the flip side, it would be unwise for a state to totally exclude non-
residents from its universities' corridors because other states might then re-
taliate against students from the state in question. 
The prospects for revenue augmentation from increasing nonresident en-
rollments are diminished by the presence of tuition reciprocity agreements. 
These are either bilateral or multilateral agreements between schools and/ 
or states allowing nonresident students to attend a public university at 
less than the normal out-of-state tuition.3 These agreements are often pro-
gram specific, have a regional focus, and were created to encourage uni-
versities to achieve cost efficiencies in their program offerings. 
An institution's ability to employ different tuition and enrollment strate-
gies is dependent upon its degree of autonomy from state interests. Be-
2. There are, of course, other sources of revenue. Total educational and general current 
fund revenues include undergraduate and graduate student tuition and fees; federal, state, 
and local appropriations; government grants and contracts; private gifts; payouts from en-
dowments; sales and services of educational activities; and other sources. Local revenues are 
typically directed to community colleges, while federal monies are focused on direct student 
support. The endowment levels at most public institutions are small, so increasing the payout 
rate is unlikely to have a large impact on annual revenues. Public institutions are actively seek-
ing to increase their fund-raising revenues, but many are starting from very low bases. 
3. In some cases, if the flow of students between states taking advantage of tuition reciproc-
ity agreements is not roughly equal, the state that exported more students than it imported 
makes a payment to the importing state to compensate it for bearing more than its fair share of 
the costs. These payments go to the state treasury, however, not to the universities themselves. 
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cause elected state officials' interests diverge from those of university ad-
ministrators and faculty members, we expect institutions in states where 
there is more legislative oversight in the form of a statewide coordinating 
board and/or fewer governing boards to find it more difficult to increase tu-
ition and to adjust their enrollment margins.4 
Some observers have expressed concern that direct student aid (both 
federal grant aid and state aid), which was designed to improve access, has 
instead given institutions the freedom to increase tuition. States' financing 
of higher education is increasingly being provided in the form of grant aid 
to students rather than in the form of appropriations to institutions. From 
1979 to 2000, average (median) direct student aid as a share of total higher 
education aid has increased from 3.0 percent to 5.8 percent (1.8 percent to 
4.8 percent). While the real value of the federal Basic Educational Oppor-
tunity Grant (Pell Grant) fell by 9 percent over this time period, access to 
federal subsidized loans was vastly expanded. In fact, by 1999,45.4 percent 
of students receiving financial aid did so in the form of federal loan aid. 
How tuition levels, or the availability of grant or loan aid, influence ac-
cess are empirical questions that we will not address in this chapter. Rather, 
we will analyze how tuition and enrollment strategies at institutions react 
to changes in federal and state need-based student aid and to state appro-
priations to public higher education institutions. The former increases stu-
dent mobility by expanding their choice set, while the latter does not travel 
with the student. 
Institutions may also choose nonresident enrollment policies to satisfy 
different interests. Because many flagship publics are also high quality in-
stitutions, they typically experience an excess demand for seats and can en-
roll nonresidents to improve academic quality or to enhance the diversity 
of their student bodies. 
Given differing state governance structures, political climates, institu-
tional objectives, and the like, it is not surprising to see the dramatic dis-
parity across states in their use of nonresidents as an enrollment strategy. 
Figure 7.1 shows that many of the larger, more populous states such as 
Ohio, Illinois, Texas, California, and New York, do not make great use of 
this strategy, enrolling less than 10 percent of their first-time freshmen 
from out-of-state in 1998.5-6 However, other states that are smaller, older, 
4. See Lowry (2001a,b). Lowry also points out that states (schools) where a high percent-
age of university trustees are appointed by elected officials or directly elected by the voting 
public also have lower tuition. 
5. The categories were defined using a means-clustering analysis described by Everitt 
(1993). This is an exploratory data technique meant to find natural groups in the data. Mul-
tiple iterations suggest that the data be broken into four nonoverlapping groups. Multiple it-
erations suggest that the most natural partition was four groups. States near the average in-
clude Maine and Georgia, enrolling about 20 percent each. 
6. Public Universities in Texas do not get to keep the extra tuition revenue they receive from 
enrolling out-of-state students; this revenue flows into the state government coffers. As such 
they have no financial incentive to enroll out-of-state students. 
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Fig. 7.1 1998 average share of first-time freshmen that are nonresidents at research institutions in the fifty 
United States (categories computed through means-clustering analysis) 
Source: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System residence and migration files. 
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and/or have a history of private provision of higher education enroll nearly 
half of their entering classes as nonresidents. Vermont, Delaware, Rhode 
Island, and New Hampshire respectively enrolled 66 percent, 60 percent, 
48 percent and 40 percent of their classes in 1998 in this manner. 
Table 7.1 lists the ninety-one flagship public research institutions whose 
behavior is analyzed in our study.7 They are primarily Research I and II in-
stitutions and were chosen because they are the most selective and largest 
public institutions in each state, and they enroll the largest shares of non-
residents, or out-of-state students. This chapter is motivated by our desire 
to understand the causes and consequences of nonresident enrollment. We 
seek to explain how the share of nonresidents among first-time freshmen 
varies at a point in time across these institutions and over time at any given 
institution. We employ panel data from a variety of sources and estimate a 
system of equations to explain the levels of state need-based grant aid per 
student, in-state tuition, out-of-state tuition, and the share of out-of-state 
students among first-time freshmen. The longitudinal nature of the data 
permits us to control for omitted variable bias. 
In the next section, we briefly survey related literature. Section 7.3 pre-
sents information on trends in tuition, enrollment, and grant aid. In addi-
tion to summarizing the data we use to explain these trends, it also dis-
cusses the results of a survey we undertook to obtain information on the 
nature and prevalence of tuition reciprocity agreements. Section 7.4 de-
scribes our estimation strategy, presents empirical results, and conducts 
some policy simulations based upon these results. Section 7.5 briefly con-
cludes. 
7.2 Selective Literature Review 
The literature on pricing and access in public higher education is replete 
with papers that analyze issues related to one or more of the following— 
state grant aid, in-state tuition, out-of-state tuition, and nonresident en-
rollment shares—but none has studied all of these issues simultaneously. 
Two papers have addressed the determinants of nonresident enrollments. 
Mixon and Hsing (1994) found, using cross-section data for a sample of 
public and private academic institutions, that higher nonresident tuition 
levels were associated with higher nonresident enrollment shares. Their 
findings lent credence to the notion that universities enroll nonresidents 
for revenue purposes. Siow (1997) found, after controlling for student body 
7. There are eighty-four schools from forty-three states that were classified as Research I 
and II institutions in 1994 by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. To 
fully exploit state variation in tuition, enrollment, and grant aid policies, we added the flag-
ship public institution from each state that did not have a Research I or II institution. These 
states were Alaska, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota. 
Table 7.1 Flagship Public Research Institutions in the Sample 
School 
Arizona State University (AZ) 
Auburn University (AL) 
Clemson University (SC) 
Colorado State University (CO) 
Florida State University (FL) 
Georgia Institute of Technology (GA) 
Indiana University at Bloomington (IN) 
Iowa State University (IA) 
Kansas State University (KS) 
Kent State University (OH) 
Louisiana State University (LA) 
Michigan State University (MI) 
Mississippi State University (MS) 
New Mexico State University (NM) 
North Carolina State University (NC) 
Ohio State University (OH) 
Ohio University (OH) 
Oklahoma State University (OK) 
Oregon State University (OR) 
Pennsylvania State University (PA) 
Purdue University (IN) 
Rutgers University, New Brunswick (NJ) 
1994 Carnegie 
Classification 
RI 
RII 
RII 
RI 
RI 
RI 
RI 
RI 
RII 
RII 
RI 
RI 
RII 
RI 
RI 
RI 
RII 
RII 
RI 
RI 
RI 
RI 
School 
University of Hawaii at Manoa (HI) 
University of Houston (TX) 
University of Idaho (ID) 
University of Illinois at Chicago (IL) 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (IL) 
University of Iowa (I A) 
Univers ty of Kansas (KS) 
University of Kentucky (NY) 
University of Louisville (KY) 
University of Maine (ME) 
University of Maryland, College Park (MD) 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst (MA) 
University of Michigan (MI) 
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities (MN) 
University of Mississippi (MS) 
University of Missouri, Columbia (MO) 
University of Montana (MT) 
University of Nebraska at Lincoln (NE) 
University of Nevada, Reno (NV) 
University of New Hampshire (NH) 
Univers ty of New Mexico (NM) 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (NC) 
1994 Carnegie 
Classification 
RI 
RII 
RII 
RI 
RI 
RI 
RI 
RI 
RII 
DII 
RI 
RI 
RI 
RI 
RII 
RI 
DII 
RI 
DII 
DII 
RI 
RI 
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale (IL) 
State University of New York at Albany (NY) 
State University of New York at Buffalo (NY) 
Temple University (PA) 
Texas A&M University (TX) 
Texas Tech University (TX) 
University of Alaska at Fairbanks (AK) 
University of Alabama, Birmingham (AL) 
University of Arizona (AZ) 
University of Arkansas (AR) 
University of California, Berkeley (CA) 
University of California, Davis (CA) 
University of California, Irvine (CA) 
University of California, Los Angeles (CA) 
University of California, Riverside (CA) 
University of California, San Diego (CA) 
University of California, Santa Barbara (CA) 
University of California, Santa Cruz (CA) 
University of Cincinnati (OH) 
University of Colorado at Boulder (CO) 
University of Connecticut (CT) 
University of Delaware (DE) 
University of Florida (FL) 
University of Georgia (GA) 
Note: Carnegie Classification descriptions can 
University of North Dakota (ND) 
University of Oklahoma, Norman Campus (OK) 
University of Oregon (OR) 
University of Pittsburgh (PA) 
University of Rhode Island (RI) 
University of South Carolina at Columbia (SC) 
University of South Dakota (SD) 
University of South Florida (FL) 
University of Tennessee at Knoxville (TN) 
University of Texas at Austin (TX) 
University of Utah (UT) 
University of Vermont (VT) 
University of Virginia (VA) 
University of Washington, Seattle (WA) 
University of Wisconsin, Madison (WI) 
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee (WI) 
University of Wyoming (WY) 
Utah State University (UT) 
Virginia Commonwealth University (VA) 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute (VA) 
Washington State University (WA) 
Wayne State University (MI) 
West Virginia University (WV) 
DII 
RII 
RII 
RI 
RII 
RII 
' DII 
RII 
RI 
RI 
RI 
RII 
RI 
RI 
RI 
RII 
RII 
RI 
RI 
RI 
RII 
RI 
RI 
negie. 
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ability, that universities with more successful researchers were more likely 
to have larger shares of nonresident and foreign students. 
Other studies have addressed the determinants of tuition levels for in-
state students at public universities. Using cross-section data, Lowry 
(2001a,b) found that net tuition and fee revenues were higher at public uni-
versities that receive less state government funding per student and in 
states in which public universities have more financial autonomy. Quigley 
and Rubinfeld (1993) found that states with high private enrollments and 
many private colleges and universities charged higher tuition levels at their 
public universities. 
Several studies have treated tuition levels at public higher education in-
stitutions and state appropriations to these institutions as being simulta-
neously determined. In the context of a model in which state appropria-
tions were treated as endogenous, Koshal and Koshal (2000) found that 
lower state appropriations per student, higher median family income, and 
a higher share of students that came from out of state were all associated 
with higher in-state tuition levels. However, Lowry's (2001 a,b) work sug-
gests that state appropriations per student can be treated as exogenous in 
in-state tuition equations. 
Greene's (1994) work is one of the few studies that addressed out-of-
state tuition levels at public universities. Using cross-section data, he found 
that states with many private colleges, lower tax rates, poor labor markets, 
and strong in-migration of both population and students charged higher 
nonresident tuition. While he observed that higher regional tuition was as-
sociated with higher nonresident tuition levels, the association was not sta-
tistically significant. 
Research relating to federal and state grant aid has addressed how grant 
aid affects tuition levels and access. Examples include Balderson (1997), 
Coopers and Lybrand (1997), Hauptman and Krop (1998), McPherson 
and Schapiro (1998), and the National Center for Education Statistics 
(2001). Of concern to many researchers and policymakers is whether aca-
demic institutions respond to increases in the Pell Grant program maxi-
mum-benefit level by increasing their tuition levels. Estimates of the size of 
this "Bennett hypothesis" at public institutions range from negligible to a 
$50 increase in tuition for every $100 increase in aid.8 Little attention has 
been given to the determination of federal grant aid levels themselves, let 
alone to how states determine how much of their resources to devote to fi-
nancial aid for students. 
Most of the prior studies are cross-section analyses and are subject to the 
criticism that unobserved institution- or state-specific variables may lead 
to biased coefficient estimates. To avoid this problem, we employ a rich lon-
8. It is named for William Bennett, the secretary of education during the Reagan adminis-
tration. 
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gitudinal institution-level data set that is derived primarily from the Higher 
Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) and its successor, the In-
tegrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), in the estima-
tion reported below. The HEGIS and IPEDS data are supplemented with 
data from numerous other sources. 
We report estimates of a system of four simultaneously determined 
equations for state need-based grant aid, in-state tuition, out-of-state tu-
ition, and the share of undergraduate students that are nonresidents. The 
explanatory variables that are treated as exogenous in our models include 
federal financial aid parameters, institutional characteristics, state gover-
nance characteristics, tuition reciprocity agreement parameters, measures 
of higher education competition in the state and the institution's enroll-
ment capacity, and other state- and regional-specific information. Our 
analyses should be viewed as reduced form in nature due to the difficulty of 
finding suitable supply-and-demand restrictions for each equation. 
7.3 Data 
Our study uses data on resident and nonresident enrollment and tuition 
levels for a sample of ninety-one American public research institutions rep-
resenting all fifty states. The data come from a variety of sources includ-
ing HEGIS, IPEDS, the National Association of State Student Grant and 
Aid Programs (NASSGAP), and the annual Current Population Surveys 
(CPS), as well as other sources. Our econometric analyses use data for eight 
years during the 1979 to 1998 period.9 
Table 7.2 presents data on the shares of full-time first-time freshmen that 
were nonresidents at sample institutions during the 1979 to 1998 period. 
Overall, the enrollment share of nonresidents rose from 0.174 to 0.191 dur-
ing the period. However, from 1981 through 1992, when states faced par-
ticularly difficult financial times, the average share increased from 0.166 to 
0.205, an increase of almost 0.04, and then remained relatively constant as 
budget situations improved during the remainder of the period. 
To illustrate the magnitude of a 4 percentage point increase in nonresi-
dent enrollment, consider a school with a freshman enrollment of 3,000 
students and a nonresident tuition premium of $6,000. If this school de-
cides to enroll 4 percent more of its class as nonresidents (120 students) 
over the course of four years, this would provide the institution with an 
additional $2.88 million of revenues that could be used to raise faculty 
salaries, invest in start-up costs for new scientists, hire additional faculty 
and staff, reduce class sizes, and offer more courses. 
9. Table 7A. 1 details the sources for all of our data. The specific years included in the study 
were dictated by the years in which information on resident and nonresident enrollments were 
collected as part of HEGIS or IPEDS. The 1998 academic year was the most recent year for 
which IPEDS Residence and Migration data was publicly available at the time of this writing. 
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Table 7.2 Proportion of First-Time Freshmen from Out of State (excluding foreign 
students): Flagship Public Research and Doctoral Institutions 
Year 
1979 
1981 
1984a 
1988 
1992 
1994 
1996 
1998 
%A 
Unweighted 
Average 
0.174 
0.166 
0.171 
0.203 
0.205 
0.202 
0.196 
0.191 
9.4 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.120 
0.120 
0.128 
0.136 
0.157 
0.152 
0.145 
0.139 
15.7 
Weighted 
Average 
0.168 
0.161 
0.170 
0.205 
0.201 
0.196 
0.194 
0.185 
10.3 
Median 
0.136 
0.133 
0.127 
0.158 
0.169 
0.172 
0.167 
0.179 
31.2 
Minimum 
0.011 
0.007 
0.010 
0.012 
0.001 
0.005 
0.005 
0.006 
-47.8 
Maximum 
0.550 
0.543 
0.629 
0.602 
0.660 
0.674 
0.665 
0.660 
19.9 
Source: NCES Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) and Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) via direct surveys and WebCASPAR. 
Notes: For weighted averages, weights are full-time equivalent first-time freshman enroll-
ments. A indicates change. 
aNumbers of out-of-state freshmen imputed for the eight California schools in 1984. 
Schools that exhibited the largest increases in nonresident enrollment 
shares during the period included Pittsburgh, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
and Mississippi State, which all more than doubled their shares during 
the period. In contrast, the University of Illinois at Chicago, Texas Tech, 
Houston, South Florida, and the University of California schools reduced 
their nonresident enrollment shares by more than half. While the time se-
ries variation in nonresident enrollment shares exhibited in this table may 
not appear very striking, more dramatic cross-section variation exists and 
can be seen in figure 7.1. 
The well-documented increases in resident and nonresident tuition that 
occurred during the period are shown in table 7.3. In real terms, both resi-
dent and nonresident tuition levels more than doubled between 1979 and 
1998, with each growing at about 4 percent per year above the rate of in-
flation. This table veils the dramatic cross-section variation that exists in 
public higher education tuition levels.' For instance, in 1998 Vermont 
charged its residents over $7,000 and Pittsburgh, Temple, Michigan, Penn 
State, and New Hampshire all charged over $6,000, while all of the Flor-
ida universities, Arizona universities, Idaho, Houston, Texas A&M, and 
the University of Nevada at Reno charged near $2,000. The public higher 
education institutions in California and Texas are among those that in-
creased tuition at the fastest rates, while the Florida and Mississippi 
schools exhibited the smallest increases during the period. 
Every public research institution charges a higher price to nonresidents, 
presumably because state taxpayers do not want to subsidize the school-
ing of nontaxpayers from other states. Moreover, the extent to which 
Table 7.3 In-State and Out-of-State Tuition Levels (1996 dollars): Flagship Public Research and Doctoral Institutions 
In-State Out-of-State 
% Weighted % Weighted 
Year 
1979 
1981 
1984 
1988 
1992 
1994 
1996 
1998 
%A 
CAGR (%) 
Average 
1,552 
(520) 
1,633 
(615) 
1,943 
(756) 
2,266 
(859) 
2,833 
(1,065) 
3,145 
(1,189) 
3,348 
(1,185) 
3,525 
(1,181) 
127 
4.2 
Increase 
5.2 
19.0 
16.6 
25.0 
11.0 
6.5 
5.3 
125 
Average 
1,582 
1,667 
2,006 
2,320 
2,887 
3,174 
3,397 
3,553 
119 
4.1 
Median 
1,509 
1,569 
1,861 
2,100 
2,656 
2,847 
3,102 
3,302 
151 
4.0 
Minimum 
676 
638 
557 
1,018 
1,315 
1,417 
1,568 
1,697 
123 
4.7 
Maximum 
3,435 
3,799 
5,126 
4,840 
6,724 
6,919 
7,726 
7,669 
137 
4.1 
Average 
4,250 
(1,273) 
4,431 
(1,401) 
5,203 
(1,614) 
6,282 
(1,833) 
8,055 
(2,551) 
8,766 
(2,768) 
9,459 
(2,659) 
10,094 
(2,687) 
142 
4.4 
Increase 
4.3 
17.4 
20.7 
28.2 
8.8 
7.9 
6.7 
134 
Average 
4,246 
4,460 
5,334 
6,454 
8,243 
8,939 
9,689 
10,284 
167 
4.5 
Median 
4,097 
4,105 
5,047 
6,059 
7,604 
8,169 
9,030 
9,586 
128 
4.3 
Minimum 
2,068 
1,844 
1,755 
3,238 
4,139 
3,982 
5,100 
5,512 
5.0 
Maximui 
8,182 
8,402 
9,799 
13,393 
16,103 
17,131 
17,916 
18,623 
4.2 
Source: NCES Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) and Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) via WebCASPAR. 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Weights are full-time equivalent first-time freshmen enrollments. CAGR = compound annual growth rate. 
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Table 7.4 In-State, Out-of-State Tuition Differentials (1996 dollars): Flagship Public 
Research and Doctoral Institutions 
Year 
1979 
1981 
1984 
1988 
1992 
1994 
1996 
1998 
%A 
CAGR (%) 
Out-of-State/ 
In-State Ratio 
(1) 
2.74 
2.71 
2.68 
2.77 
2.84 
2.79 
2.82 
2.86 
4.6 
0.2 
Mean 
Differential 
(2) 
2,698 
2,798 
3,260 
4,016 
5,222 
5,620 
6,110 
6,569 
143 
4.5 
% Increase in 
Differential 
(3) 
3.7 
16.5 
23.2 
30.0 
7.6 
8.7 
7.5 
Weighted 
Average 
(4) 
2,664 
2,793 
3,328 
4,133 
5,357 
5,765 
6,292 
6,731 
153 
4.7 
Median 
(5) 
2,537 
2,517 
3,150 
3,878 
4,855 
5,471 
6,060 
6,471 
155 
4.8 
Minimum 
(6) 
1,138 
1,077 
1,198 
1,469 
1,878 
1,770 
2,400 
2,537 
123 
4.1 
Maximui 
(7) 
5,028 
5,321 
6,526 
8,968 
10,891 
11,439 
12,206 
12,695 
152 
4.7 
Source: NCES Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) and Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS) via direct surveys and WebCASPAR. 
Notes: Weights are full-time equivalent first-time freshmen enrollment. CAGR = compound annual 
growth rate. A = change. 
nonresidents pay more than residents increased during the period. While 
both in-state and nonresident tuition levels have experienced roughly 
equal percentage increases during the period and, thus, the ratio of non-
resident to in-state tuition has remained nearly constant, the real differ-
ence in resident and nonresident tuition levels substantially increased dur-
ing the period because nonresident tuition levels began at a higher base. 
Table 7.3 shows that while in-state tuition increased by an average of 
less than $2,000 in real terms, nonresident tuition increased by an aver-
age of more than $5,000 in real terms. As a result, the average premium 
charged to nonresidents has increased in real terms from $2,700 in 1979 
to over $6,500 in 1998 (see table 7.4). This change is significant because as 
the absolute difference between in-state and nonresident tuition widens, 
out-of-state enrollments become less desirable from the student-demand 
side.10 
The lowest out-of-state tuition levels and smallest increases occurred 
largely in the southeastern region. Both the largest out-of-state tuition lev-
els and tuition increases occurred at Michigan, the Virginia schools, North 
Carolina schools, and the California schools. As with the overall level of 
nonresident tuition, the smallest premia charged to nonresidents and the 
smallest increases tended to occur at southeastern public institutions. The 
strong regional patterns that we observe in tuition and enrollment trends 
10. These raw data suggest that during the period institutions adjusted their out-of-state tu-
ition levels to generate revenue. 
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suggest the importance of historical competitive and political economic 
factors. 
Turning to trends in state support for public higher education, tables 7.5 
and 7.6 outline the changes in state need-based grant aid to students at-
tending public institutions and state appropriations to public higher edu-
cation institutions that occurred during the period. Table 7.5 shows that 
average state-provided need-based grant aid per full-time-equivalent un-
dergraduate enrolled in public higher education institutions in the state has 
Table 7.5 Need-Based Grant Aid to In-State Undergraduate Public Students per 
Full-Time Equivalent Public Undergraduate in the State (1996 dollars): 
Flagship Public Research and Doctoral Institutions 
Year 
1979 
1981 
1984 
1988 
1992 
1994 
1996 
1998 
%A 
CAGR (%) 
Unweighted 
Average 
67.5 
77.2 
93.2 
117.0 
128.6 
139.1 
183.5 
284.7 
321.6 
7.5 
Standard 
Deviation 
78.4 
89.9 
127.0 
134.2 
140.4 
162.4 
196.6 
322.0 
310.8 
7.3 
Median 
34.9 
45.2 
51.3 
60.9 
89.2 
92.0 
125.8 
180.2 
416.8 
8.6 
Minimum 
5.4 
4.5 
11.0 
10.3 
9.0 
10.8 
10.7 
6.8 
25.6 
1.1 
Maximum 
415.9 
410.9 
663.4 
594.8 
644.0 
881.1 
949.1 
1,585.6 
281.2 
6.9 
Source: NASSGAP Annual Reports, HEGIS, and IPEDS. 
Notes: CAGR = compound annual growth rate. A = change. 
Table 7.6 State Appropriations per FTE Undergraduate (1996 dollars): Flagship 
Public Research and Doctoral Institutions 
Unweighted Weighted Standard 
Year 
1979 
1981 
1984 
1988 
1992 
1994 
1996 
1998 
2000 
%A 
CAGR (%) 
Average 
9,446 
9,394 
9,977 
11,397 
11,227 
11,069 
11,204 
10,777 
11,402 
20.7 
0.9 
Average 
8,932 
8,809 
9,544 
10,788 
10,934 
10,835 
10,922 
10,569 
11,173 
25.1 
1.0 
Deviation 
4,355 
4,747 
4,495 
5,203 
4,769 
4,522 
4,429 
4,030 
4,364 
0.2 
0.0 
Median 
8,430 
8,532 
9,162 
10,615 
10,549 
10,454 
10,666 
10,429 
11,032 
30.9 
1.2 
Minimum 
3,200 
3,126 
3,180 
3,698 
3,300 
3,361 
3,180 
3,218 
3,328 
4.0 
0.2 
Maximui 
25,297 
29,429 
26,045 
24,741 
26,736 
25,372 
24,421 
23,306 
24,073 
-4.8 
-0.2 
Source: HEGIS and IPEDS. 
Notes: CAGR = compound annual growth rate. A = change. 
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more than quadrupled in real terms, growing from roughly $67 per student 
per year to $285 per student per year.11 One recent study found that 68.5 
percent of first-time full-time students enrolled in public higher education 
institutions received financial aid from any source and that 26.9 percent of 
these students received state grant aid averaging $1,742 per year.12 Inas-
much as the average in-state tuition in 1998 was $3,525, state grant aid 
alone appears to cover over half of the tuition costs for eligible students. 
Among the most generous states, in terms of state-provided grant aid per 
full-time-equivalent student enrolled in public higher education institu-
tions are New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, while the least generous 
states include Wyoming, Utah, Montana, and Mississippi. New Mexico, 
Virginia, Washington, Maine, and Massachusetts are among those states 
that increased state aid per student the fastest during the period, while 
Utah, Wyoming, Montana, Alabama, and Mississippi actually decreased, 
in real terms, the amount of need-based grant aid they awarded per student 
enrolled in public institutions during the period. While direct student aid 
grew rapidly, real state appropriations per full-time-equivalent student to 
public higher education institutions saw very little growth during the pe-
riod. Table 7.6 summarizes data on real average state government appro-
priations per full-time-equivalent undergraduate. Nationwide real state 
appropriations per student did not increase between 1988 and 2000 and 
only grew by 21 percent between 1979 and 2000, a 1 percent per annum an-
nual growth rate. Again, dramatic cross-section variation existed in state 
funding per student. 
A few states were able to generously increase support for selected insti-
tutions during the period. New Mexico, Maryland, Georgia Tech, Maine, 
and Oklahoma State all enjoyed a doubling of real state support, amount-
ing to increases between $6,000 and $12,000 per student. However, of the 
ninety-one schools in our sample, twenty-two faced decreases in real state 
appropriations per student between 1979 and 2000. Among the hardest hit 
were many of the California and Virginia schools, each losing anywhere 
from 10 percent to 49 percent of its state support. These losses represented 
$1,000 to $12,000 per-student cuts in real state appropriations. 
In the face of budget pressures and changing political attitudes, states 
may have an easier time funding direct student aid increases under the 
guise of promoting access. Legislators and their constituents may also pre-
fer not to fund institutions directly because they may worry that the dol-
11. Although the annual percentage increases in real student grant aid (7.5 percent) out-
paced the annual real increases in tuition (4.5 percent), the real dollar cost to students still 
rose during the period. 
12. See National Center for Education Statistics (2001). In addition, 28.3 percent of aid re-
cipients receive federal grants averaging $2,262, 30.9 percent of aid recipients received insti-
tutional grants averaging $2,576 per student, and 45.4 percent received loan aid averaging 
$3,490 per student in 1999. 
Resident and Nonresident Tuition at Flagship State Universities 317 
lars will not go to the intended uses. Raw correlations, however, do not in-
dicate that states that are more generous to students are less generous to in-
stitutions (the simple correlation coefficient is 0.14). In fact, it appears that 
there are states that are generous to higher education on both dimensions 
and states that are not. 
Figure 7.2 depicts state preferences for direct student aid versus institu-
tional aid in 1996, controlling for per capita tax revenues.13 Controlling for 
per capita tax revenues accounts for the fact that states that have more 
money will be able to spend more on both grants and institutional appro-
priations. The axes represent U.S. averages. We see that New York, Michi-
gan, Maryland, and California exert a great deal of effort to fund both stu-
dent financial aid and state appropriations to public higher education, 
while Wyoming, Nebraska, Delaware, Idaho, Utah, and Montana fund 
neither very well. Some states do appear to prefer one form of aid to an-
other. New Jersey, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Illinois are above average 
funders of public higher education institutions, while Alaska, Hawaii, 
North Dakota, and Mississippi are above average funders of aid to stu-
dents.14 Wealthier and larger states seem to support higher education on 
both fronts (northeast quadrant of figure 7.2) more greatly than the rural 
and poorer states (southwest quadrant of figure 7.2). It is somewhat of a 
surprise that no clear regional disparities emerge when comparing state 
preferences for direct student aid versus in-kind institutional aid. 
During the 1990s, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and New 
Mexico each introduced direct student financial aid programs that were 
based on student performance rather than student need. In some cases 
these grant aid awards came at the expense of their need-based aid pro-
grams. The largest program was Georgia's Helping Outstanding Pupils Ed-
ucationally (HOPE) Scholarship Program, which awarded $208 million of 
Georgia's total grant aid support of $209 million in academic year 1998. 
Florida and New Mexico's programs each comprised well over 50 percent 
of their states' total grant aid funding, while the programs in Mississippi 
and Arkansas were very small. 
Tuition reciprocity agreements are agreements between a school or state 
and another state or consortium that allow a nonresident student from a 
neighboring state to attend the public institution at less than the normal 
out-of-state tuition. The magnitude of the discount may depend on the 
type of program in which a student is interested, the county in which a stu-
dent resides, the availability of opportunities in the home state, whether the 
13. Figure 7.2 plots normalized residuals from a regression of grant aid on per capita tax 
revenues in 1996 against residuals from a regression of state appropriations on per capita tax 
revenues in 1996. These are institution-level regressions, and each point on the graph repre-
sents enrollment weighted state averages for those states with multiple institutions. 
14. This table shows results for need-based aid. Many states are now moving to merit-based 
aid programs (e.g., Georgia), and inclusion of this would alter this picture. 
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Fig. 7.2 1996 state appropriation per student versus need-based grant aid per student 
Note: Plot of state averages of residuals from regression of state appropriations per student on per capita tax revenues versus residuals from regres-
sion of grant aid per student on per capita tax revenues. 
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student is an undergraduate or graduate, whether the student attends part-
or full-time, and many other factors. While some schools negotiate agree-
ments bilaterally with other states, many now choose to participate in con-
sortium agreements in which a number of states in a geographical region 
are treated similarly under the agreement. 
Tuition reciprocity agreements typically do not require that an institution 
accept a given number of students, or all students whose "quality" is above 
a specified level, from out-of-state. They only specify that if the out-of-state 
students are admitted, that the tuition charged to them be below the normal 
out-of-state student rate. Given that the political process has approved the 
agreement, at the margin, institutions will only accept students under a tu-
ition reciprocity agreement if there is excess capacity at the institution for 
the programs in which the students are applying or if the accepted students 
yield more in prestige to the university than accepting more in-state stu-
dents would yield the institution and if rejecting the marginal in-state stu-
dents will not cause political problems for the institution.15 
Under these circumstances, the marginal revenue received by the public 
university from accepting out-of-state students enrolled under tuition rec-
iprocity agreements is always at least equal to the marginal revenue the in-
stitution would have received if it had not enrolled these students. While 
the marginal revenue the institution receives from a student admitted un-
der a tuition reciprocity agreement may be less than the institution would 
have received if it could have enrolled more out-of-state students paying its 
normal out of state tuition, the latter would not always be possible. More-
over, the state as a whole is better off with the tuition reciprocity agreement 
because students from the state also have the opportunity to study in other 
states' public institutions. As we have indicated above, if the balance of stu-
dents flowing between two states is not equal, often there are additional 
payments made directly to the coffers of the state that is receiving more stu-
dents than it is sending. 
In the spring of 2001, CHERI conducted a Tuition Reciprocity Agree-
ments at Public Research and Doctoral Universities survey. The sample 
consisted of all 149 public institutions that were classified as Research or 
Doctoral institutions by the Carnegie Foundation in their 1994 classifica-
tion scheme. Of the 128 universities that responded to the survey, 61 said 
that they participated in a tuition reciprocity program with schools in an-
other state or as part of a consortium. Table 7.7 indicates that thirty-nine 
of the ninety-one institutions in our sample, a slightly smaller percentage 
than found in our reciprocity survey sample, participated in such an ar-
rangement. 
15. Because of these conditions, sometimes the flagship institutions in a state opt out of the 
program. So, for example, the University of California campuses are not part of the Western 
Interstate Commission on Higher Education (WICHE) undergraduate exchange consortium, 
but the California Maritime Academy at California State University is a participant. 
Table 7.7 Tuition Reciprocity Agreements 
Year 
1979 
1981 
1984 
1988 
1992 
1994 
1996 
No. of Schools 
Reporting Reciprocal 
Enrollments 
(1) 
3 
4 
10 
15 
20 
24 
28 
Agreements That 
Don't Report 
Enrollment 
(2) 
36 
35 
29 
24 
19 
15 
11 
Mean Share of 
Undergrads That Are 
Reciprocal (%) 
(3) 
3.6 
3.1 
7.6 
6.7 
5.5 
Max. Share of 
Undergrads That Are 
Reciprocal (%) 
(4) 
16.6 
22.4 
30.1 
30.1 
28.6 
Mean Share of 
Enrollment That Are 
Nonresidents (%) 
(5) 
21.5 
23.8 
24.2 
25.4 
23.9 
Mean Share of 
Nonresidents That 
Are Reciprocal (%) 
(6) 
16.7 
13.0 
31.4 
26.4 
23.0 
Source: HEGIS, IPEDS, and 2001 Annual Cornell Higher Education Research Institute Survey. For more information about this survey, please see http://www 
.ilr.cornell.edu/cheri and click on "Surveys." 
Note: Column (5) reports results for those schools that report reciprocal enrollment. 
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Four consortia are represented among our survey responses: the Aca-
demic Common Market, the Midwest Student Exchange Program, the 
New England Regional Student Program, and the Western Interstate 
Commission for Higher Education. Some institutions in the survey also 
participate in student exchange programs (e.g., the National Student Ex-
change, the Consortium of Universities in the Washington Metropolitan 
Area, and the Tuition Exchange, Inc.)- Student exchange programs differ 
from reciprocity agreements in that students participating in them are ei-
ther visiting another school for a specified time period, or eligibility is lim-
ited to a narrowly defined group of students.16 
While the number of schools participating in these agreements has not 
changed over our sample period, columns (4) and (5) suggest that students 
have been increasingly taking advantage of such programs. In addition, the 
schools that report reciprocal enrollments also enroll a larger share of non-
residents than the average school in our survey. In 1996, for example, an av-
erage of 23.9 percent of enrolled students were nonresidents in the twenty-
eight schools reporting reciprocal enrollments, while an average of 19.6 
percent of enrolled students were nonresidents in the entire sample. 
Increasing nonresident enrollment shares under these programs does 
not translate into higher revenues for public higher education institutions 
given that these students often pay the in-state tuition level.17 The final col-
umn of the table indicates that for these schools, nearly a quarter of their 
nonresident enrollments are covered under this plan. Returning to our ex-
ample from earlier, a typical school would then forgo about $720,000 in ad-
ditional tuition revenues due to the presence of these agreements.18 
7.4 Estimation Strategy and Results 
7.4.1 Model Specification 
To achieve a fuller understanding of the causes and consequences of 
changing tuition and enrollments, we move to a multivariate analysis. We 
16. A brief description of each of the consortia and exchange programs and the institutions 
participating in each is found at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/cheri. Click on surveys and then 
click on tuition reciprocity. 
17. Recall from the preceding that sometimes revenues flow from one state to another if the 
flow of students across the two states does not equalize. However, such revenues accrue to the 
state, not to the academic institution. 
18. Of course, it is unlikely that anyone would leave cash on the table. The long-term cost 
savings from eliminating program duplication will very likely make up for the revenue losses. 
States might also gain politically from engaging in these agreements. States that send students 
likely save money because they do not have to establish and maintain costly programs. States 
and colleges that receive students can operate programs more efficiently because they gain 
quality students, and if the supply of students is elastic, they might be able to fill spaces that 
otherwise would have been vacant. Students benefit by not having to pay out-of-state tuition, 
which may have prevented many of them from earning degrees in the fields they had chosen. 
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estimate a system of four simultaneously determined equations using panel 
data, with the institution year as our unit of analysis in which the logarithm 
of state need-based grant aid per student, the logarithm of in-state tuition, 
the logarithm of out-of-state tuition, and the logarithm of the odds ratio of 
the share of first-time freshmen that are nonresidents are each specified to 
be functions of each other, a vector of exogenous variables and random un-
correlated (across equations) error terms.19 Our model should be thought 
of as being only a "semistructural," rather than a structural model, because 
the variables found on the right-hand side of each equation likely capture 
both demand and supply factors and represent an equilibrium condition in 
the underlying structural model. 
Table 7A.3 provides the reader a sense of from which side of the market 
each variable originates. The variables are grouped into six major cate-
gories: state demographic and institutional variables, variables reflecting 
the sources of institutional aid, variables reflecting the sources of student 
financial aid (including federal financial aid program variables), variables 
reflecting institutional enrollment pressures, variables reflecting quality 
measures and the competitive position of the institutions, and the endoge-
nous variables.20 
The table shows the variables that are excluded and included in each 
equation.21 A blank indicates that the variable is excluded from that equa-
tion. For included variables, D indicates that the variable is assumed to in-
fluence the outcome through the demand side of the market, S indicates 
that it is assumed to influence the outcome through the supply side of the 
market, and B indicates that it is assumed to influence the outcome 
through both sides of the market. Similarly, + indicates that we expect that 
the net effect of the variable is to increase the outcome, - indicates that we 
expect that the net effect of the variable is to decrease the outcome, and ? 
indicates that the prediction is ambiguous. Our preferred specification for 
each of the four equations of interest is described in the following. 
The state need-based grant aid equation is assumed to result from the in-
teraction of students' demand for financial aid and the state's willingness 
to supply it. The in-state tuition equation is assumed to result from the in-
teraction of in-state students' demand for seats at the institution and the 
institution's willingness to supply such seats. The institution's willingness 
19. The first variable, average state need-based aid per student, is observed at the state, not 
institutional, level. 
20. These categories are not mutually exclusive. Some variables might be considered to have 
an impact for multiple reasons. For example, institutions with larger per-student endowments 
have greater financial capabilities ("institutional financial aid"), but larger endowments are 
also indicative of an institution's "high quality." Further, it is not unreasonable to think that 
enrollment-pressure variables and school-quality variables also capture an institution's com-
petitive position to the same extent as well. 
21. There are obvious complications in estimating the system exactly as we have specified 
it here. The most glaring difficulty is our ability (or lack thereof) to properly identify the sys-
tem of equations. We discuss the structural system here for expositional purposes and address 
the empirical relevance in detail in the next section. 
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to supply seats can be thought of as being derived from a utility-
maximizing model of university behavior in which the objective of the uni-
versity is to maximize its prestige, which in turn depends upon the average 
quality of the students that it enrolls, subject to a balanced budget con-
straint (Ehrenberg and Sherman 1984; Ehrenberg 2000; Garvin 1980; Win-
ston 1999). A public university's behavior may also be constrained by its 
state government, which may have different objectives than the university 
does. For example, while the university may want to maximize student 
quality, the political process may want to keep in-state tuition as low as 
possible (Groen and White 2001). The out-of-state tuition and the share of 
nonresident students enrolled at an institution are similarly assumed to re-
sult from the interaction of out-of-state students' demand for seats at the 
institution and the institution's willingness to supply such seats, the latter 
constrained by the political process in the state. 
The grant aid equation includes variables that relate to federal and other 
state and institutional sources of student financial aid. Federal loan and 
grant program variables included in the model are the size of the maximum 
Pell Grant (PELL), the percent cap on costs (CAP), and categorical vari-
ables that indicate the degree of access that students have to subsidized 
federal loans (1979, 1992).22 The presence of state merit aid programs 
(MERIT) both reduces student demand for need-based aid and the state's 
pool of available resources from which it might fund need-based aid pro-
grams. Variables that relate to institutional sources of aid are the logarithm 
of real state appropriations per student (APP), the logarithm of real 
endowment per student (END), and the logarithm of in-state tuition 
(TUITI)—each of these variables generates income that the institution can 
use, in principle, for scholarship aid. State demographic and institutional 
structure variables that are included in this equation (to capture a state's fi-
nancial capacity to provide need-based student aid) are its real tax rev-
enues per capita (TAX), its unemployment rate (UNEMP), the share of its 
households with incomes below that necessary to be eligible for a Pell 
Grant (ELIG), and the share of its population that is college aged (AGE). 
Also included is the degree of political autonomy of each school, as mea-
sured by the number of governing boards in the state (GOV).23 
22. The percent cap is a percentage of college costs that students were eligible to receive in 
Pell Grants. The cap was removed in 1992 so that students at low-tuition institutions that were 
eligible for the maximum Pell Grant could use any funds in excess of tuition costs to pay for 
living and other expenses. In 1981, student access to subsidized loans was dramatically re-
duced with the repeal of the Middle Income Student Assistance Act (MISAA) after a run-up 
in usage from its inception in 1978. Access was expanded again in 1992 with the removal of a 
portion of housing assets in the Expected Family Contribution formula. 
23. Lowry (2001a,b) hypothesized that the greater the number of different independent 
governing boards in a state, the more decentralized state governance of higher education was 
and, thus, the less that political pressure from the state could be used to keep tuition levels 
down. He found evidence that this relationship held. It is not clear, however, whether state aid 
per student will be higher or lower in states with more political autonomy for their higher ed-
ucation institutions. 
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To control for the impact of enrollment pressure on grant aid, we include 
a measure of state seating capacity (SEAT), calculated as the ratio of a 
state's predicted enrollment in its public higher education institutions to its 
actual enrollment in these institutions in a year.24 Additional measures of 
enrollment pressures that are included are the ratio of graduate enroll-
ments to undergraduate enrollments in the state (GRAD); the share of new 
students in the state enrolled in private colleges (PRIV) and in two-year 
colleges (TWO); and the logarithm of real average tuition in the region ex-
cluding the state in which the institution is located (TUITR).25 Also in-
cluded are measures of overall quality in the state, as measured by the 
weighted average Barron's rating of public (BPUB) and private (BPRIV) 
institutions in the state. 
Our in-state tuition equation is similarly specified. However, real state 
tax revenues per capita are excluded from this equation because the impact 
of state resources on tuition is captured by the inclusion of real state ap-
propriations per student (APP). The latter is treated as exogenous in our 
model.26 In addition, we include institutional measures of school quality— 
categorical variables that indicate the Barron's rank of each institution as 
well as the level of per-student grant aid (the dependent variable in the pre-
vious equation)—where higher levels would be expected to allow institu-
tions to raise tuition.27 
More generous student financial aid packages (e.g., federal financial aid 
programs) make it easier for a school to increase tuition for at least two rea-
sons. First, federal financial aid may reduce barriers to entry for students 
24. Predicted enrollments are calculated by dividing a state's full-time equivalent public 
four-year enrollment in 1970 by the size of the college-age population in the state in 1970 (ages 
eighteen-twenty-four) and then multiplying this ratio by a weighted cohort size in each year 
of our study. If both the share of students going to public institutions and college enrollment 
rates in a state remained constant over time, then the weight used to calculate predicted en-
rollments in year t would simply be the size of the college-age population in year t. Between 
1970 and 1998, the share of students attending public institutions was stable (between 75 and 
80 percent), but enrollment rates increased nationwide from 28.8 percent to 42 percent. To 
account for the enrollment rate expansion, we allow the population weight to grow as the en-
rollment rate grows in each year. We would prefer to have used the ratio of seats available in 
public colleges to the number of its high school graduates as a capacity measure, but we did 
not do so because of endogeneity concerns. Nonetheless, estimates that excluded this variable 
from the analysis were very similar to those that included it. Because this suggests that the en-
dogeneity of capacity is not driving our results, this variable is included in all of the estimates 
that follow. 
25. The grant aid per student equation is estimated using state-level data. As such, all in-
stitution-level variables, including real state appropriations per student, are excluded from 
this equation. 
26. As noted previously, Lowry (2001a,b) found that it was permissible to treat state ap-
propriations per student as exogenous in the in-state tuition equation. 
27. For roughly three decades, Barrens Profiles of American Colleges has assigned cate-
gorical rankings to four-year institutions according to a subjective measure of quality. From 
best to worst, they rank institutions as most competitive, highly competitive, very competitive, 
competitive, less competitive, and noncompetitive. We created a categorical variable HIGHB 
for those institutions in the top two categories as well as LOWB for those in the bottom two. 
The coefficients on these variables are then relative to the omitted middle categories. 
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at the margin of attending college. Second, institutions can increase tu-
ition, and for those students not at the grant or loan limits, each dollar of 
tuition increase will be covered by an additional dollar of aid, up until some 
maximum. Further, the availability of merit aid will increase the desirabil-
ity of attending college for all students, putting upward pressure on tuition. 
Institutional sources of aid have a less obvious impact on tuition. While in-
creased state appropriations per student may allow schools to keep tuition 
low, this increase in in-kind student aid may result in an increase in de-
mand, forcing tuition upward. Larger endowments per student generate 
more income for an institution, but more importantly reflect higher in-
stitutional quality and permit higher tuition levels. Similarly, higher insti-
tutional quality in absolute (as measured by the Barron's ranking) and 
relative terms (as measured by the ranking of other schools in the state) 
measures as well as strong enrollment pressure allows institutions to 
charge high tuition levels. 
The logarithm of real out-of-state tuition (TUITO) is specified to be a 
function of the logarithm of real in-state tuition (TUITI) and most of the 
variables included in the in-state tuition equation. Again, real state tax rev-
enue per capita is excluded from the equation. A notable difference is that 
we replace the institution's Barron's ranking with measures of the shares of 
students in the state enrolled at other public (BSPUB) or private (BSPRIV) 
institutions in the state that are of equal or better Barron's rankings than 
the institution. These variables capture the institution's monopoly power 
within the state for students seeking to attend institutions of its quality or 
higher. Similarly, we include the share of students in the region enrolled 
in schools of equal or better quality that are enrolled in private schools 
(SPRIV); the greater this share, the higher the average tuition will be at in-
stitutions perceived as good alternatives to the institution. The logarithm 
of the share of first-time freshmen that are nonresidents (NON) is included 
to capture the financial benefits to the institution from increasing out-of-
state enrollment. Finally, we include the logarithm of the share of under-
graduates that are enrolled under reciprocity agreements (RECIP) whose 
a priori impact on nonresident tuition is unclear. 
The final equation is the nonresident enrollment share equation. The de-
pendent variable is specified as the logarithm of the odds ratio of the share 
of first-time freshmen that are nonresidents to allow the error term to be 
normally distributed. This equation is specified very similarly to the out-
of-state tuition equation, with the logarithm of real out-of-state tuition 
(TUITO) included as an explanatory variable. We also include the loga-
rithm of the mean Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores in the state in 
which the institution is located (SAT) to see if states with a low supply of 
"high-quality" high school graduates seek to recruit out-of-state students 
to attract top talent.28 
28. Groen and White (forthcoming) discuss this issue in detail. 
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Starting with the Georgia HOPE program, which was established in 
1993, a number of states have recently adopted merit-based grant aid pro-
grams for students who attend college within state. These programs in-
crease the incentive that students from those states have to attend college 
within state (Dynarski, chap. 2 in this volume). During our sample period, 
only Georgia, Arkansas, Florida, New Mexico, and Mississippi instituted 
such programs (between 1994 and 1998), but seven more did so by 2002. 
Such programs should serve to increase the demand for in-state students to 
attend public institutions in the state, which may limit the public institu-
tion's ability to expand, or even maintain, its nonresident enrollment share. 
We include year/state interaction terms for those years in which an institu-
tion was in a state that had adopted one of these programs in the nonresi-
dent enrollment share equation to test if these programs do, in fact, reduce 
nonresident enrollment shares.29 
We present two types of estimates for each equation. First, to under-
stand why tuition, grant aid, and nonresident enrollment vary across states 
and institutions at a point in time, we present pooled cross-section time se-
ries estimates, using institutional level data for eight years between 1979 
and 1998. Year dichotomous variables are included in these models to con-
trol for idiosyncratic time effects. 
While the wide variation in the cross-section data makes this approach 
appealing, it is subject to possible omitted-variables bias. For example, in-
stitutions located in beautiful areas, other factors held constant, may be 
able to charge higher tuitions. In this example, omission of "beauty" as an 
explanatory variable might bias the estimates of other explanatory vari-
ables' parameters effects on tuition if these variables are correlated with 
"beauty." We have attempted to minimize this problem by including a care-
fully constructed, rich set of explanatory variables in our models. 
An alternative way of controlling for omitted variables is to take ad-
vantage of the panel nature of the data and employ a fixed effects estima-
tion strategy. The panel data results are useful in understanding how 
changes in explanatory variables affect changes in the dependent variables. 
In addition, the panel data results will be employed to simulate how 
changes in key explanatory variables will affect changes in the outcomes 
of interest to us. 
Inasmuch as these four outcomes are determined simultaneously, we 
would prefer to estimate a jointly determined system of four equations us-
ing two-stage least squares (2SLS) to control for the endogeneity of these 
outcomes.30 However, the success of this procedure is highly dependent on 
29. For example, we include a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for Georgia in-
stitutions in our sample for 1994, 1996, and 1998 and is zero otherwise. 
30. The 2SLS estimation is necessary to attempt to correct for the biases that result from 
the violation of the orthogonality conditions necessary for ordinary least squares (OLS) to be 
unbiased, though the signs of the potential biases here are ambiguous. 
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finding appropriate "instruments" for the endogenous variables in the sys-
tem.31 Determining a suitable vector of restrictions has proven to be a chal-
lenging endeavor, and to avoid debate over the restrictions we have chosen, 
we will report estimates from the reduced-form model for our system. 
The reduced form is found by solving for the endogenous variables in the 
system. What one is left with is a system of four outcome equations, with 
each outcome being a function of purely exogenous variables. Without 
agreement on acceptable exclusion restrictions, we are unable to recover 
the underlying structural parameters from estimates of the reduced-form 
model. However, the only real cost of using this procedure is that we are 
unable to make direct assessments of the impacts that changes in each of 
the outcomes explicitly has on the other outcomes in the system. 
We should caution that without a properly specified structural model, 
one cannot be sure that the estimated associations in our data are causal. 
However, we believe that our results are of interest and provide a guide to 
how a public university and prospective students react to state actions and 
other changes in environmental variables. Those estimates and those we 
tried using a variety of different sets of instruments proved to be very sim-
ilar to the estimates of the reduced-form system that follows. Tables 7A.4 
and 7A.5 present the 2SLS "structural" results for readers that are inter-
ested in these findings.32 
7.4.2 Econometric Estimates: Cross-Section Findings 
The odd-numbered columns of tables 7.8 and 7.9 present the estimated 
coefficients from the cross-section equations. We have suppressed the stan-
31. We tried to instrument using the following: In the grant aid equation, we instrument for 
in-state tuition using the institution's Barron's ranking because the quality of an institution's 
students likely affects tuition, but not a state's willingness to disperse financial aid to all stu-
dents in the state. In the in-state tuition equation, we instrument for grant aid with state tax 
revenues per capita and the weighted ranking of public schools in the state. In the out-of-state 
tuition equation, we instrument for in-state tuition with state private enrollment share, state 
two-year enrollment share, weighted ranking of private schools in the state, state tax revenues 
per capita, and weighted rank of public schools in the state. Nonresident enrollment shares 
are instrumented with average SAT scores of high school seniors in the state. In the nonresi-
dent enrollment share equation, out-of-state tuition is instrumented with state private enroll-
ment share, state two-year enrollment share, weighted ranking of private schools in the state, 
state tax revenues per capita, and weighted rank of public schools in the state. 
32. Although finding suitable exclusion restrictions is a challenging endeavor for this sys-
tem of equations, the estimates in tables 7A.4 and 7A.5 have proven to be robust to a variety 
of specification changes. The key exclusion restrictions that are necessary to identify the 
model are real state tax revenue per capita in the in-state and out-of-state tuition equations 
and average SAT scores of high school students in the state in the nonresident enrollment 
share equation. Many of the other exclusions are made to reduce multicollinearity. We sus-
pect that the insensitivity of the 2SLS estimates and their similarity to reduced-form estimates 
is due to the instruments being either "too weak" or "too strong." By the former, we mean that 
there is not enough exogenous variation to produce a change in the outcome in question (with 
a corresponding large asymptotic variance matrix of the 2SLS estimator). By the latter, we 
mean that the instruments may also be correlated with the underlying model's disturbance 
term. 
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Table 7.8 State Need Based Grant Aid and Instate Tuition Equations Reduced Form 
Regression Results 
Variable 
State demographics/institutional characteristics 
Log tax revenues per capita (TAX) 
Log unemployment (UNEMP) 
Share of population aged 18-24 (AGE) 
Share of population with incomes below maximum 
Pell allowable (ELIG) 
Log number of governing boards (GOV) 
Sources of institutional aid 
Log state appropriations per student (APP) 
Log endowment per student (END) 
Sources of student financial aid 
Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL) 
Percent cap on costs (CAP) 
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979) 
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992) 
Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) 
Florida Merit Program (MERIT) 
Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) 
Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT) 
New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) 
Enrollment pressure 
Ratio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) 
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 
Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) 
Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 
Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 
School quality/competitive position 
Weak Barron's rank (LOWB) 
Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB) 
Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 
Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 
Adjusted R2 
Grant Aid 
Cross 
Section 
(1) 
0.57* 
0.34* 
-23.38* 
-0.07 
0.01 
-0.27* 
0.02 
-10.70 
-3.50 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1.01* 
-0.82 
-1.77* 
-1.90* 
0.69 
0.14* 
1.36* 
0.63* 
-0.87* 
0.27* 
0.04 
-0.01 
0.32* 
0.30* 
Panel 
(2) 
0.20* 
0.04 
-13.49* 
1.14* 
n.a. 
0.53* 
0.01 
1.32* 
0.70* 
0.57* 
0.73* 
0.77* 
-0.30 
-1.55* 
-1.01* 
0.73* 
-0.09 
-1.14* 
1.32* 
0.31* 
-0.08 
0.03 
-0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
In-State Tuition 
Cross 
Section 
(3) 
0.07 
0.20* 
0.49 
-1.23* 
0.00 
-0.24* 
0.02* 
-1.89 
-0.72 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0.05 
-0.47* 
-0.15 
0.19 
-0.21 
0.05* 
0.86* 
-0.35* 
-0.23* 
0.12* 
0.00 
0.10* 
0.00 
0.05* 
Panel 
(4) 
0.05 
0.08* 
-9.31* 
0.40 
n.a. 
-0.18* 
0.01 
0.48* 
0.34* 
0.15* 
0.38* 
0.24* 
-0.19* 
-0.10 
-0.09 
-0.07 
-0.02 
0.53* 
-0.07 
0.15* 
0.06* 
0.06* 
0.06 
0.04* 
0.01 
0.595 0.618 0.722 0.866 
Notes: FTE = full-time equivalent. FTEFTF = full-time equivalent first-time freshmen, n.a. 
plicable. 
*Significant at the 95 percent level. 
not ap-
dard error reporting to make the tables more readable. Variables that have 
an asterisk (*) are significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Turning 
first to the average state need-based grant aid per-student equation (col-
umn [1]), it appears that differences across states in the level of per-student 
grant aid awards are best explained by differences in demographic charac-
Table 7.9 Out-of-State Tuition and Nonresident Enrollment Share Equations Reduced Form 
Regression Results 
Variable 
State demographics/institutional characteristics 
Log tax revenues per capita (TAX) 
Log unemployment (UNEMP) 
Share of population aged 18-24 (AGE) 
Share of population with incomes below maximum 
Pell allowable (ELIG) 
Log number of governing boards (GOV) 
Sources of institutional aid 
Log state appropriations per student (APP) 
Log endowment per student (END) 
Sources of student financial aid 
Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL) 
Percent cap on costs (CAP) 
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979) 
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992) 
Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) 
Florida Merit Program (MERIT) 
Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) 
Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT) 
New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) 
Enrollment pressure 
Ratio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) 
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 
Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) 
Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 
Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 
Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements 
(RECIP) 
School quality/competitive position 
Weak Barron's rank (LOWB) 
Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB) 
Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 
Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 
Institution's share of quality public seats in the state 
(BSPUB) 
Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state 
(BSPRIV) 
Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 
Log SAT (SAT) 
Adjusted R2 
Out-of-State 
Tuition 
Cross 
Section 
(1) 
0.00 
0.13* 
-1.26 
-1.25* 
0.00 
-0.15* 
0.05* 
-0.35 
-0.43 
n.a. 
n.a. 
-0.08* 
-0.27 
-0.11* 
-0.27* 
-0.02 
-0.01 
0.20* 
-0.09 
0.04 
0.15* 
Panel 
(2) 
0.08* 
0.05* 
-4.10* 
0.59* 
n.a. 
-0.23* 
0.01* 
0.16 
-0.17* 
0.05* 
0.46* 
0.17* 
-0.02 
-0.07 
-0.03 
0.03 
0.02 
0.19 
0.08 
0.16* 
0.10* 
Nonresident 
Share 
Cross 
Section 
(3) 
-0.25 
-0.37* 
10.16* 
1.24* 
-0.03* 
-1.16* 
0.16* 
5.11 
1.57 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0.17 
-1.28* 
-0.29 
0.48 
0.31 
-0.04 
0.39 
-0.37* 
-0.26* 
0.08 
Panel 
(4) 
-0.21* 
-0.16* 
3.45 
-1.10 
n.a. 
0.07 
0.04 
0.00 
0.08* 
-0.52* 
-0.84* 
-0.44 
-1.18* 
-0.44* 
0.24 
0.18 
-0.10 
-0.67 
0.23 
-0.28* 
0.35* 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.37* 
-0.01 
0.794 
0.00 -0.09* 
-0.04 
0.00 
-0.11 
2.11* 
0.904 
1.29* 
0.01* 
-0.03 
-1.07* 
0.501 
0.06 
n.a. 
0.04 
0.04* 
0.07* 
n.a. 
0.00 
0.05* 
0.03 
n.a. 
-0.20 
-0.31* 
0.28* 
n.a. 
0.11 
0.04 
-0.03 
0.28* 
0.00 
-0.56* 
-0.15 
0.204 
Notes: FTE = full-time equivalent. FTEFTF = full-time equivalent first-time freshmen, n.a. = not ap-
plicable. 
*Significant at the 95 percent level. 
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teristics, enrollment pressures, and overall institutional quality in the 
states.33 
With respect to demographic characteristics, wealthier states, as mea-
sured by per capita tax revenues (TAX), award more grant aid per student, 
but states in which a larger share of the population is of college age (AGE) 
award less aid per student. Further, states in which labor markets are loose 
award more grant aid per student. However, institutional autonomy 
(GOV) does not seem to be correlated with state grant aid generosity. 
The entire vector of enrollment and state quality variables are strongly 
related to grant aid awards. Undergraduates in states with less competition 
for funds with more costly graduate students (GRAD) receive more grant 
aid. In addition, when private and community college enrollments (PRIV, 
TWO) are large relative to public four-year college enrollments, grant aid 
awards are larger—presumably due to the private colleges' subsidizing 
their own students and the large in-kind subsidy provided by the low-cost 
(and hence low state appropriations) community colleges.34 Further, the 
average (excluding in-state) tuition in the region (TUITR) that the state is 
located in seems to be positively correlated with the level of grant aid that 
is awarded. Curiously, states with greater available seating capacity in their 
public institutions—that is, their predicted enrollments exceed what they 
actually enroll in a given year (SEAT)—award less grant aid per student, 
contrary to our a priori expectation. As expected, states with higher-
quality public (BPUB) and private (BPRIV) academic institutions, and 
thus likely higher costs, offer more grant aid. 
Do other sources of student financial aid affect state need-based grant 
aid awards? One might expect that growing state affinities for non-need-
based aid programs would crowd out spending on need-based grant aid to 
students. The preliminary evidence varies by state. While it is not surpris-
ing to see that Georgia, Mississippi, and Florida have coupled increasing 
merit-based aid generosity with decreasing need-based aid support, it is 
surprising to see that Arkansas and New Mexico have responded by in-
creasing their need-based aid generosity, ceteris parabis. However, as 
hinted at by figure 7.2, it appears that states prefer one type of aid to an-
other. It appears that states awarding larger in-kind awards (state appro-
priation per student to four-year institutions [APP]) award significantly 
less grant aid per student than states where appropriations are lower. 
Moving to the in-state tuition equation (column [3]), we find that sources 
of institutional aid and enrollment pressures go a long way in explaining 
33. All of the results discussed in the paper are ceteris paribus, or other variables in the 
model held constant, findings. 
34. However, this result may be picking up higher-order moments of the state income dis-
tribution as the share of two-year students from lower-income families is far greater than that 
for four-year students. Therefore, states with comparatively large two-year enrollments may 
have wider and lower income distributions than others. 
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differences across institutions in in-state tuition levels. Schools that receive 
higher state appropriations per student (APP) charge lower tuition, though 
the elasticity is far from unity. Taken together, the impacts of having a 
strong Barron's ranking (HIGHB) and having higher endowment per stu-
dent (END) suggest that higher-quality schools are able to charge more for 
their product. 
Once again, the entire enrollment-pressure vector is significant in ex-
plaining cross-institution variation in in-state tuition levels. When private 
competition in a state is important, as measured by the share of first-time 
freshmen in the state that are enrolled in private academic institutions 
(PRIV), public universities are able to charge higher tuition, as do institu-
tions in states in which a smaller share of students attend two-year colleges 
(TWO). A striking result is that the cross-section evidence suggests that 
in-state undergraduate students are partially subsidizing the huge costs 
of graduate education at these research universities. Across institutions, 
the higher the ratio of graduate to undergraduate students (GRAD), the 
higher the in-state undergraduate tuition. However, this finding might 
merely reflect that universities with larger shares of their students enrolled 
as graduate students may be higher-quality institutions, which attract bet-
ter faculty and thus can charge higher tuition levels to its residents. Not 
surprising, however, is that institutions with more seating capacity (SEAT) 
tend to charge a lower price for their product and that higher regional tu-
ition (TUITR) allows institutions to charge a higher price. 
There is little evidence that differences in student financial aid affect in-
state tuition levels and mixed evidence on state demographic and institu-
tional factors. Public universities in states in which the unemployment rate 
(UNEMP) is high, and hence the opportunity cost of enrolling in school is 
low, charge higher in-state tuition. Unlike Lowry (2001b), we find no evi-
dence that public universities in states with more autonomous governance 
structures (GOV) charge higher tuition. 
Column (5) of table 7.9 displays the results for the nonresident tuition 
equation. Contrary to our results for in-state tuition, we do not find that 
nonresident undergraduates are subsidizing graduate education. Also, 
given that nonresident enrollments can be viewed to either enhance rev-
enues or school quality, it is not surprising that institutional aid and 
school-quality variables primarily drive the out-of-state tuition results. 
Institutions receiving higher state appropriations per student (APP) 
charge less to nonresidents, though the elasticity is small, and institutions 
with larger endowments per student (END) charge a higher price to non-
residents. Further, schools charge nonresidents more in states in which the 
average quality of private colleges (BPRTV) and public colleges (BPUB) 
are higher. As alluded to previously, these quality measures are closely re-
lated to the broader concept of competitive position. In the case of non-
resident tuition, regional competition clearly also matters, as schools lo-
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cated in regions in which a large share of students attend private schools 
(SPRIV) are able to charge more to out-of-state residents. Similarly, when 
the average tuition in the geographical region is higher (TUITR), schools 
also charge more to nonresidents. 
While demographic characteristics in the state affect nonresident tuition 
the same way they affect in-state tuition, unlike in the in-state tuition equa-
tion, evidence of the impact of merit-aid programs (MERIT) on tuition is 
not mixed. These programs seem to have had a negative effect on nonresi-
dent tuition levels—likely deriving from the fact that the increasing preva-
lence of merit-based aid programs provides an incentive for students who 
otherwise would have attended more costly out-of-state or private institu-
tions to remain in-state. 
Column (7) presents the nonresident enrollment share equation. Taken 
as a whole, the entire vector of variables aside from the sources of student 
financial aid are strong predictors (across institutions) of nonresident en-
rollment share differences. The results seem to indicate that nonresident 
students are used both for the purposes of generating revenues and to aug-
ment institutional quality. Turning to the institutional aid variables, we see 
that states providing higher state appropriations per student (APP) tend to 
enroll fewer nonresidents. While one might expect nonresidents to prefer 
to attend institutions that receive more state support per student, some-
times state support per student is endogenous in the sense that institutions 
may receive greater state appropriations per student for each in-state stu-
dent they enroll. Further, institutions that receive high levels of state sup-
port may not need to turn to nonresidents to generate needed revenues. We 
also find that schools with larger endowments per student (END) attract 
more nonresidents—further suggesting that this variable be included in 
the "quality" vector. 
Flagship public institutions face political pressure to ensure access to 
the children of state residents. We do not find, however, that when seating 
capacity at all public institutions in a state is low (SEAT), that public in-
stitutions enroll smaller fractions of nonresidents. In fact, we find that 
institutions with a shortage of capacity enroll the largest nonresident en-
rollment shares.35 Again, this might be a result of the higher-quality insti-
tutions being the ones with less excess capacity than lesser institutions. An-
other enrollment result that is somewhat surprising is that institutions that 
enroll a larger share of their undergraduates under tuition reciprocity 
agreements (RECIP) tend to enroll a smaller share of nonresidents than 
other institutions. 
We do find that schools located in states where high school student qual-
35. Due to concerns that the enrollment constraints at the University of California may be 
heavily influencing our results, we reestimated all of our equations without these schools. 
These results were very similar (with larger standard errors) to those presented in the text. 
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ity is relatively poor (SAT) enroll a larger share of nonresidents—they need 
to look elsewhere to find high-quality students. Another variable relating 
to institutional quality is the institution's share of enrollments in a state at 
schools of equal or higher quality. Other variables held constant, institu-
tions whose enrollment is large relative to the total of all public enrollments 
(BSPUB) or all private enrollments (BSPRIV) at institutions of equal or 
greater quality in the state have larger shares of nonresident enrollments.36 
It is also not surprising to see that institutions located in states where the 
average quality of public institutions is high (BPUB) tend to enroll more 
nonresidents, and those in states where average private school quality 
(BPRIV) is high enroll fewer nonresidents. Given the tuition premium paid 
by nonresidents at public institutions, the cost-per-quality unit of attend-
ing private schools in the state may be comparable to that for attending 
out-of-state public institutions. 
Turning last to the demographic characteristics, the effect of unemploy-
ment rates and the proportion of households that are Pell Grant eligible are 
as expected. Contrary to our expectations, we find that once we control for 
other factors, schools in states with more governing boards (GOV), hence 
more autonomous institutions, enroll smaller shares of nonresidents. Fur-
ther, the institutions located in states with larger college-aged population 
shares (AGE) enroll more nonresidents. 
7.4.3 Econometric Estimates—Panel Data Results 
The even-numbered columns of tables 7.8 and 7.9 present our fixed 
effects estimates. Because these parameters are estimated from within in-
stitution changes over time, they are useful for understanding the potential 
impacts of policy changes. One might expect that because most of the vari-
ation in our data occurs across institutions, fewer statistically significant 
coefficients would arise, but this is not what we observe. Our discussion fo-
cuses on results that significantly differ from those found in the cross sec-
tion, and we make some brief comments on those that do not, which are 
noteworthy nonetheless.37 
Turning first to the state need-based grant aid equation (column [2]), we 
find that changes in sources of student financial aid are the primary deter-
minants of changes in state student need-based grant aid. As students have 
more access to federal grants (PELL, CAP) and loans (1979, 1992), states 
respond by awarding more grant aid. Three other results stand out. First, 
36. For example, for the public schools, we simply take the ratio of full-time-equivalent 
first-time freshmen enrollments in the school under observation and divide it by the total 
number of full-time-equivalent first-time freshmen students in public institutions in the state 
that have at least as high a Barron's ranking as the school under observation. 
37. If a so-called "fixed effect" result differs from a cross-sectional estimate, it is likely be-
cause the cross-sectional equations did not properly control for time-invariant, institution-
(or state-) specific information that was also correlated with the other explanatory variables 
in the model. 
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we find that, controlling for other factors, increases in state appropriations 
per student (APP) lead to states' awarding more grant aid—indicating that 
in-kind aid and direct student aid are perhaps complementary. Second, the 
impact of enrollment pressures within states is very different than the im-
pact across states. Most notably, we find that as the seating capacity in a 
state increases (SEAT), states respond by awarding more need-based grant 
aid per student. Third, we find that state grant aid responds to changes in 
the income distribution of a state's population. An increase in the share of 
households whose incomes fall below the maximum level that permits 
them to be eligible for Pell Grants (ELIG) leads to higher levels of state 
need-based grant aid per student. Note, too, that changes in institutional 
quality in the state are not good predictors of grant aid changes. In fact, 
since quality measures are unlikely to vary much within institutions over 
time, we do not expect to find statistical significance in many of these vari-
ables in any of the equations. As a result, we will ignore these variables in 
the discussion that follows. 
We turn next to the in-state tuition equation (column [4]). While institu-
tional aid and enrollment factors were largely responsible for explaining 
cross-institutional differences in the cross section, these results indicate 
that changes in the availability of student financial aid are also very im-
portant. In addition, the impact of enrollment pressures and demographic 
changes are felt somewhat differently. 
We find that increased state appropriations per student (AID) are still 
associated with lower in-state tuition changes, but neither increases in en-
dowment per student (END) nor changes in the share of students that are 
graduate students (GRAD) are statistically significantly associated with 
changes in in-state tuition in the panel. What may be of concern to policy-
makers is that it appears that institutions are attempting to capture the ad-
ditional revenues that have been generated by federal financial aid pro-
grams. We find that an increase in the generosity of the Pell Grant (PELL) 
by 10 percent leads institutions to raise in-state tuition levels by 4.8 per-
cent. We also find that tuition has also significantly increased as students 
have had more access to federal subsidized loans (19xx). The implementa-
tion of state merit-aid programs has produced mixed results, with tuition 
rising in the Arkansas institutions and falling in the Florida institutions. 
Two additional results are of interest. Unlike in the cross section, as the 
share of the population that is college aged (AGE) increases, in-state tu-
ition levels fall, but increases in seating capacity result in tuition increases. 
The latter result is difficult to explain and may reflect reverse causality in 
the data, despite our best efforts to control for this potential occurrence. 
The nonresident tuition equation results in the panel (column [6]) are 
very similar to the cross-section results, with the most notable difference 
being that changes in nonresident tuition are largely explained by changes 
in state demographic characteristics. As tax revenues, unemployment 
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rates, and the share of households with low incomes increase within a state, 
we find that nonresident tuition will increase. As the college-aged popula-
tion increases in its size relative to the remainder of the population, we find 
that nonresident tuition will decrease. While we saw that institutions re-
sponded to federal grant aid increases by increasing in-state tuition, we do 
not see the same occurring with nonresident tuition. However, it appears 
that as students have more access to federal subsidized loans, institutions 
in-turn respond by increasing nonresident tuition. An interesting differ-
ence from the cross-section results is that as average SAT scores improve 
within a state, institutions will have less pressure to pursue nonresident 
enrollment strategies to improve quality, and we find this manifestation 
through nonresident tuition increases. Last, just as in the in-state tuition 
equation and similarly puzzling, we find that as seating capacity increases 
at an institution, it responds by increasing nonresident tuition. 
Finally, turning to the nonresident enrollment share equation (column 
[8]), we see that the fixed effects results are starkly different from the cross-
sectional results. No longer do institutional aid factors matter. This may be 
due to the finding that as state tax revenues increase (and hence the pool of 
funds available for institutional and student aid), nonresident enrollment 
shares decrease within an institution. 
While sources of student financial aid were not able to explain cross-
sectional differences in nonresident enrollments, taken as a whole they 
seem to do a better job of explaining within-institution changes. We find 
that as the cap on costs covered by the Pell Grant increases (CAP), more 
nonresidents would attend an institution, but surprisingly, as access to 
subsidized loans expands, fewer nonresidents would attend. The presence 
of merit-aid programs in Florida and Georgia have led institutions in each 
state to enroll far fewer nonresidents than they had before these programs 
were instituted.38 
As a whole, changes in enrollment pressure are not able to explain 
changes in nonresident enrollment shares. However, we find that nonresi-
dent enrollment shares increase as regional tuition levels (TUITR) in-
crease. Last, as more of the quality slots in institutions in a region are in 
private schools (SPRIV), the share of nonresidents at the public schools 
falls. Taken as a whole, these results indicate that nonresident student de-
mand is primarily responsible for explaining within-institution changes in 
nonresident enrollment shares over time. 
Before turning to some simple policy simulations in the next section, we 
address several important issues. First, inasmuch as we are estimating a re-
duced-form system, it is natural to run specifications with and without cer-
tain variables that might be problematic (e.g., seating capacity, state ap-
38. An unstated goal of each of these programs was to keep high-quality residents from at-
tending universities out of state. This evidence suggests that this may have indeed occurred. 
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propriations per student, state need-based grant aid per student) to see 
how sensitive our other results are to those variables' inclusion or omis-
sion. Our estimates of the system when we exclude/include different per-
mutations of the preceding three variables proved to be remarkably similar 
to the previously described results. Second, it would be interesting to de-
termine the impact that per-student need-based grant aid awards have on 
tuition and enrollments. Because grant aid is a state-level, rather than an 
institutional-level, variable one can argue that it is reasonable to treat it as 
exogenous to the institution and include it as an explanatory variable in the 
other equations. We have done this, and the results are reported in tables 
7A.6 and 7A.7. 
When per-student grant aid is included as an explanatory variable, the 
estimated effects of the other variables in the model are qualitatively (and 
in most cases quantitatively) similar to the results presented in tables 7.8 
and 7.9. What is interesting is that we find an impact of state need-based 
grant aid per student on tuition and enrollment only in the cross section. 
That is, institutions located in states that award more need-based student 
aid are those that charge the highest in-state and nonresident tuition, ce-
teris parabis, and are also the institutions that enroll the smallest share 
of nonresidents. However, changes in state need-based grant aid do not 
affect changes in in-state and nonresident tuition and nonresident enroll-
ment. 
7.4.4 Policy Simulations 
Table 7.10 outlines the effects that selected policy changes have on the 
four outcomes, using the panel data estimates presented in tables 7.8 and 
7.9.39 The discussion below focuses only on those factors that are likely to 
vary substantially between years. Inspection of the grant aid results indi-
cates that changes in grant aid are a result of a variety of factors in a state, 
not solely the result of economic factors. If a state at the average per-
student grant aid level experienced an increase of $1,000 in per capita tax 
revenues, that state would only increase per-student grant aid by $12 over 
an average of $307. It appears that there are some spillover effects of in-
creasing institutional and other student sources of financial aid. When the 
Pell Grant maximum is increased by $100, we see states respond by in-
creasing per-student need-based grant aid by $14, and when states increase 
state appropriations per student by $1,000, they also increase support for 
students by $15. 
Increases in state support for higher education institutions helps to curb 
39. The table reports marginal effects from the presented regressions evaluated at the 
sample means in the data. When we calculated the marginal effects for individual institutions 
and then took their means, the impacts were nearly identical. 
Resident and Nonresident Tuition at Flagship State Universities 337 
12* 
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0 
-3 
11* 
-3 
32 
58* 
-60* 
2 
-5 
63* 
23* 
158* 
56 
-222* 
7* 
20 
187* 
145* 
-1.16* 
-0.01 
0.19 
0.05 
-0.30 
-0.81* 
1.42* 
20 
201* 
-24 
10,094 
0.16 
-0.40 
0.003 
19.1% 
Table 7.10 Effect of Selected Policy Changes on Outcomes: Fixed Effects Reduced-Form 
Regression Results, Evaluated at 1998 Level of Appropriate Variable 
Grant In-State Out-of-State 
Aid Tuition Tuition Nonresident 
Selected Policy Change ($) ($) ($) Share 
Increase state tax revenues per capita by $ 1,000 
Increase maximum real Pell Grant award by $100 
Increase real state appropriations per student by 
$1,000 
Increase real endowment per student by $1,000 
Increase ratio of grad students to first-time 
freshmen by 10 points 
Increasing seating capacity 10 percentage points 
Increases in average regional tuition by $1,000 
Increase share of students enrolled in privates by 
1 percentage point -15* 80* 84 -0.82 
Increase share of students enrolled in two-year 
schools by 1 percentage point 10* -6 
Having higher SAT scores by 10 points in your state 
Increasing the share of students reciprocal by 10 
percentage points 
Average 1998 value of dependent variable 307 3,525 
Notes: Nonresident share represents percentage point changes: for example, -2.0 would indicate that 
nonresident share falls from x percent to (x - 2) percent. For enrollment equation, numbers indicate per-
centage point change in share due to being in this category relative to average. Table reports marginal 
effects evaluated at mean. 
*Significant at the 95 percent level. 
in-state tuition increases, but the magnitude of this effect is quite small. For 
the average institution in our sample, it would take an increase of $1,000 in 
state appropriations per student to generate an in-state tuition reduction of 
only $60. The comparable reduction in out-of-state tuition would be larger, 
about $222. The small estimated elasticities of some of the other variables 
are misleading. For example, while the elasticity of in-state tuition with re-
spect to the Pell Grant is only 0.48, this translates into institutions raising 
in-state tuition by $58 every time the Pell Grant maximum increases by 
$100 (while the magnitude of the effect is similar for nonresident tuition, 
the effect is not statistically significant). This result is particularly alarming 
when one considers that a majority of students receiving the Pell Grant do 
not receive the maximum award (and thus will experience a larger price in-
crease than those at the margin) and that the Pell Grant program annually 
exceeds its program allocation from Congress. 
Finally, our estimates suggest that most things within institutional or 
state control would fail to influence the share of nonresidents that public 
universities enroll. Even the statistical impact of reciprocity agreements is 
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inconsequential. While increases in average tuition rates in the region tend 
to increase nonresident enrollment shares, clearly individual institutions 
have little or no control over these rates. About the only tool a state seems 
to have at its disposal (according to this model) to reduce the dependence 
on nonresidents is to raise tax revenues. Our estimates suggest that raising 
per capita tax revenues by $1,000 will result in the nonresident enrollment 
share falling by 1.2 percentage points—which would probably not be 
viewed favorably by state taxpayers. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have analyzed why state need-based grant aid per stu-
dent, in-state and out-of-state tuition levels, and nonresident enrollment 
shares differ across flagship public research universities at a point in time 
and how each changes over time. There are wide disparities across states in 
political persuasion, demographic characteristics, income, the availability 
of private college alternatives, historical factors, university governance, 
and funding priorities that lead to most of the cross-section differences that 
we observe in these outcomes. Exploiting the panel nature of the data en-
ables us to control for unmeasured institutional heterogeneity and allows a 
look within specific institutions to determine which factors are most im-
portant in determining changes in these outcomes. 
This paper was largely motivated by our interest in understanding why 
flagship public institutions make such varying use of nonresident enroll-
ments. As such, the major insight that we draw is that these public insti-
tutions do not appear to use nonresident enrollments to supplement or 
replace revenues (as is the a priori belief of many observers). Rather, it 
appears that they enroll nonresidents to improve institutional quality or to 
serve other interests. This assessment can be reached after considering 
three major findings in this paper. 
First, the flagship institutions appear to use nonresident enrollments to 
take advantage of cost efficiencies achieved through participation in tu-
ition reciprocity agreements. Though the empirical evidence we present on 
the matter is scant, the increased usage of tuition reciprocity programs (as 
observed in our survey) suggests that institutions realize the revenue limi-
tation in expanding nonresident enrollments. Further, these agreements 
also reflect the growing regionalization of these state schools. In fact, we 
find that institutions respond to higher regional tuition by charging high 
in-state and out-of-state tuition and we see that nonresident students tend 
to migrate more often when average tuition in their region of residence is 
higher. 
Second, it does appear that institutions attempt to capture additional 
revenues by cannibalizing the monies provided by federal and state grant 
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aid programs. Consistent with the Bennett hypothesis, we find substantial 
evidence that increases in the generosity of the federal Pell Grant program, 
access to subsidized loans, and state need-based grant aid awards lead to 
increases in in-state tuition levels. However, we find no evidence that non-
resident tuition is increased as a result of these programs. This observation 
suggests that institutions look to nonresident enrollments not as a revenue 
source but rather as a quality source. In fact, our nonresident tuition re-
sults provide more support for this theory by showing that institutions 
decrease nonresident tuition substantially when the quality of the high 
school graduates in their own state falls ($200 for every fall in average SAT 
scores by 10 points). Further, there is little evidence that institutions in 
states where merit-based aid programs were initiated have made attempts 
to capture these additional monies in the form of higher tuition (with the 
exception of Arkansas). However, recent research suggests that institu-
tions in other states attempt to capture rents through increases in other fees 
and charges (Long, forthcoming). 
Third, while differences in state appropriations per student can partially 
explain cross-sectional differences in the use of nonresident enrollments, it 
does not appear that public institutions make up for losses in state institu-
tional appropriations by adjusting the proportion of students they enroll 
from out of state. As expected, we find that institutions respond to state ap-
propriations slowdowns by increasing both in-state and nonresident tu-
ition. The lack of response to changes in state appropriations in the non-
resident enrollment share suggests that the top flagship institutions may 
have already reached an equilibrium with regard to nonresident enroll-
ments. 
It should also be recognized that institutional and overall measures of 
state education quality and competitive position are very strong predictors 
of cross-sectional differences in tuition and enrollment. Clearly, these fac-
tors do not vary rapidly within institutions or states over time, so it is not 
surprising that we are unable to parse out any statistically significant rela-
tionship between these factors and the tuition and enrollment outcomes. 
This should not be taken to diminish the importance of these factors. 
We must caution that the period our data span ends before the recession 
of the early years of the twenty-first century, the accompanying growing 
tightness in state government budgets, and thus the decline in the growth— 
and in some cases the decline in the level—of real state appropriations per 
student to public higher education institutions. Finding other sources of 
revenue became increasingly important to public higher education institu-
tions, and a number increased their in-state tuition levels at double-digit 
rates for the 2002-2003 academic year. Time will tell if they will increas-
ingly turn to out-of-state students' tuition revenues to fill the holes in their 
budgets. 
Appendix 
Table 7A.1 Sources and Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition/Explanation Source 
1979 Dummy for years subsequent to repeal of Middle Income Student Assistant Act in 1979, which reinstated needs test for 1.2 
eligibility for subsidized federal loans 
1992 Dummy for years subsequent to 1992, when the 5.64% of home equity that was taxable in the expected family contribu- 1.2 
tion (EFC) calculation was removed from taxable assets 
AGE Share of population in a state between ages 18 and 24 3 
AID Logarithm of need-based state grant aid to in-state undergraduate students attending institutions in their own state per 4 
full-time equivalent four-year undergraduate in the state. Includes federal matching LEAP/SSIG monies 
APP Logarithm of state government appropriations in 1,000s per full-time equivalent undergraduate at the institution 5 
BPRIV Undergraduate enrollment weighted average Barron's ranking of all rated four-year private institutions in the state 6.5 
BPUB Undergraduate enrollment weighted average Barron's ranking of all rated four-year public institutions in the state 6.5 
BSPRIV Institution's undergraduate enrollment divided by the total undergraduate enrollment of all equally or higher-rated private 6.5 
(Barron's) institutions in the state 
BSPUB Institution's undergraduate enrollment divided by the total undergraduate enrollment of all equally or higher-rated public 6.5 
(Barron's) institutions in the state (including the institution of observation) 
CAP Maximum percentage of college costs covered by Pell Grants. Initially 50% of costs, raised to 60% in 1986 and eliminated 7 
in 1992. 
ELIG Share of state's households with incomes below the maximum allowable to be eligible to receive federal grant aid. Maxi- 8.7 
mum income eligibility estimated from EFC calculation. 
END Logarithm of institutional endowment in 1,000s per full-time equivalent undergraduate at the institution 5 
GOV Number of governing boards in the state 9 
GRAD Ratio of full-time equivalent graduate students to full-time equivalent undergraduate students at the institution 5 
HIGHB Dummy variable equal to 1 if Barron's ranking is "Highly Competitive" or "Most Competitive" 6 
LOWB Dummy variable equal to 1 if Barron's ranking is "Not Competitive" or "Less Competitive" 6 
MERIT Dummy variable equal to 1 if state had a merit aid program in that year 4 
NON 
PELL 
PRIV 
RECIP 
SAT 
SEAT 
SPRIV 
TAX 
TUITI 
TUITO 
TUITR (EQUN 1&2) 
TUITR (EQUN 3&4) 
TWO 
UNEMP 
Logarithm of the share of first-time freshmen that are nonresident, nonforeign students. In nonresident share equation, 5.10 
we use the log-odds ratio. That is the share divided by one minus the share. 
Logarithm of the maximum available Pell Grant award 7 
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 
Logarithm of the share of full-time equivalent undergraduates enrolled under tuition reciprocity programs 11 
Average SAT score in the state (includes public and private high school students) 12 
Maximum number of full-time equivalent first-time freshman enrollment in the state historically at public schools of 5.12 
equal or greater Barron's rank divided by the current number of high school graduates in the state 
In the census region, the share of full-time equivalent first-time freshmen in schools that are of equal or greater Barron's 5.6 
rank that are enrolled in private schools 
Logarithm of total state tax revenues received per population in the state, excluding federal receipts, in 1,000s 13.3 
Logarithm of in-state tuition charged 5 
Logarithm of out-of-state tuition charged 5 
Logarithm of the enrollment weighted average of public out-of-state (for schools outside my state), public in-state (for 5 
schools in my state, excluding my school), and private tuition in the census region 
Logarithm of the enrollment weighted average of public in-state, public out-of-state, and private tuition in the census 5 
region, including schools in the state of observation 
Share of public full-time equivalent first-time freshman enrollment in the state in two-year colleges 5 
Logarithm of the state average unemployment rate 14 
Sources: 1. United States Department of Education web site; 2. Michael Mumper, Removing College Price Barriers, SUNY Press, 1996; 3. U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus, Population Estimates Program—Age distribution data on web site; 4. National Association of State Scholarship and Grant Programs. Annual Survey Re-
ports; 5. Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System Surveys via WebCASPAR (see http://caspar.nsf.gov or www.nces.ed.gov/ipeds); 6. Barron's Profiles of 
American Colleges, 1979-1996; 7. American Council on Education Center for Policy Analysis, 2000 Status Report on the Pell Grant Program; 8. Current Popula-
tion Surveys, Estimates of Income of Households by State 1979-1996; 9. Education Commission of the States; 10. Older resident enrollment data from Higher 
Education General Information Surveys not available on WebCASPAR retrieved through original "Fall Residence and Migration Surveys;" 11. Cornell Higher 
Education Research Institute (CHERI), Survey of Tuition Reciprocity Programs of Public Research Doctoral Institutions. Summer 2001 (available on CHERI web-
site at www.ilr.cornell.edu/cheri); 12. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics; 13. U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, Census of Governments via the Statistical Abstract of the United States; 14. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and 
Earnings. 
Notes: FTEFTF = full-time equivalent first-time freshmen. All data in real values using 1996 calendar year GDP impact price deflator. 
Table 7A.2 Average Values of Selected Independent Variables 
Variable 1979 1981 1988 1992 1994 1996 1998 
State demographics/institutional characteristics 
Per capita real state tax revenues 
Unemployment rate 
Share of population aged 18-24 (%) 
Share of population with incomes below Pell 
maximum (%) 
Sources of institutional aid 
Endowment per student 
Sources of student financial aid 
Pell Grant award (real) 
Enrollment pressure 
No. of graduate students/first-time 
freshmen 
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (%) 
Share of FTEFTF in state in two-years (%) 
Seating capacity (predicted/actual) 
Composite regional tuition 
Composition regional tuition, ex-in-state 
School and student quality/competitive 
position 
No. of schools strong Barron's rank 
No. of schools weak Barron's rank 
Weighted rank of privates in state 
Weighted rank of publics in state 
Institution's share of state's quality private 
seats (%) 251.0 299.3 262.0 267.7 273.9 191.6 191.6 
Institution's share of state's quality public 
seats (%) 
Share of quality regional seats, private (%) 
Average SAT scores of high school 
graduates 936 939 1,042 966 1,043 1,057 1,062 
Notes: Table contains values for those variables not in earlier tables. Also excludes categorical variables. 
FTEFTF = full-time equivalent first-time freshmen. 
2,279 
5.78 
13.5 
63.9 
957 
3,416 
1.20 
30.3 
45.7 
1.34 
2,932 
4,217 
2 
17 
2.56 
2.38 
1,865 
6.91 
13.3 
57.5 
1,401 
2,663 
1.24 
30.7 
47.3 
1.31 
3,086 
4,439 
3 
15 
2.64 
2.39 
3,070 
6.43 
11.1 
53.5 
4,466 
2,734 
1.27 
30.0 
44.0 
0.99 
5,567 
8,005 
5 
16 
2.90 
2.60 
2,535 
6.51 
10.2 
49.3 
7,726 
2,617 
1.59 
31.1 
46.0 
0.82 
6,090 
8,721 
13 
13 
2.74 
2.60 
2,669 
6.36 
9.9 
45.0 
9,809 
2,392 
1.58 
30.7 
44.9 
0.82 
6,332 
9,047 
11 
7 
2.98 
2.66 
4,720 
5.38 
9.6 
44.9 
13,977 
2,470 
1.49 
30.2 
44.2 
0.81 
6,672 
9,541 
11 
11 
2.98 
2.67 
5,185 
4.80 
9.7 
49.8 
19,337 
2,917 
1.10 
23.3 
41.9 
0.86 
7,059 
10,002 
11 
11 
2.98 
2.67 
47.9 
37.8 
47.5 
37.3 
52.9 
39.4 
50.8 
40.9 
51.1 
40.0 
49.9 
39.5 
49.9 
39.5 
Table 7A.3 Expected Impacts and Exclusion Restrictions in Estimated Equations 
Equation 
Grant In-State Out-of-State Nonresident 
Variable Aid Tuition Tuition Share 
Endogenous variables 
Log need-based grant aid per public student 
(AID) D+ 
Log in-state tuition (TUITI) 
Lot out-of-state tuition (TUITO) 
Log nonresident enrollment share (NON) 
State demographics/institutional characteristics 
Log state tax revenues per capita (TAX) 
Log unemployment (UNEMP) 
Share of population aged 18-24 (AGE) 
Share of population with incomes below 
maximum Pell allowable (ELIG) 
Log number of governing boards (GOV) 
Sources of institutional aid 
Log state appropriations per student (APP) 
Log endowment per student (END) 
Sources of student financial aid 
Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL) 
Percent cap on costs (CAP) 
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979) 
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992) 
State merit-based aid programs (MERIT) 
Enrollment pressure 
Ratio of the grad to undergrad enrollments 
(GRAD) 
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 
Share of FTEFTF in state 2 years (TWO) 
Log seating capacity (SEAT) 
Log composite regional tuition (TUITR) 
Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity 
agreements (RECIP) B? B? 
School and student quality/competitive position 
Weak Barron's rank (LOWB) 
Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB) 
Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state 
(BPRIV) 
Weighted Barron's rank publics in state (BPUB) 
Institution's share of quality public seats in the 
state (BSPUB) 
Institution's share of quality private seats in the 
state (BSPRIV) 
Share of quality seats in region that are private 
(SPRIV) 
Log SAT (SAT) 
Notes: D, S, or B refers to whether the variable would be included in a structural demand equation, a 
supply equation, or both, respectively. + or - refers to our a priori prediction on the direction of a vari-
able's impact on the outcome under analysis. FTEFTF = full-time equivalent first-time freshmen. 
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Table 7A.4 Structural Estimates: Two-Stage Least Squares Regression Results 
Variable 
Grant Aid 
Cross 
Section Panel 
(1) (2) 
In-State Tuition 
Cross 
Section Panel 
(3) (4) 
A. State Need-Based Grant Aid and In-State Tuition Equations 
Endogenous variables 
Log need-based grant aid per public student (AID) 0.27* 0.18 
Log in-state tuition (TUITI) 1.59* 0.30 
State demographics/institutional characteristics 
Log state tax revenues per capita (TAX) 
Log unemployment (UNEMP) 
Share of population aged 18-24 (AGE) 
Share of population with incomes below maximum 
Pell allowable (ELIG) 
Log number of governing boards (GOV) 
Sources of institutional aid 
Log state appropriations per student (APP) 
Log endowment per student (END) 
Sources of student financial aid 
Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL) 
Percent cap on costs (CAP) 
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979) 
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992) 
Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) 
Florida Merit Program (MERIT) 
Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) 
Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT) 
New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) 
Enrollment pressure 
Ratio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) 
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 
Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) 
Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 
Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 
School and student quality/competitive position 
Weak Barron's rank (LOWB) 
Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB) 
Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 
Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 
Adjusted/?2 0.585 0.618 0.647 0.843 
0.48* 
0.01 
24.49* 
2.00* 
0.01 
0.10 
-0.01 
-7.95 
-2.40 
0.64 
n.a. 
0.93* 
-0.10 
-1.58* 
-2.18* 
1.04 
0.05 
-0.06 
1.20* 
-0.50* 
0.08 
0.31* 
0.20* 
0.19* 
0.02 
-10.67 
1.03 
0.59* 
0.01 
1.17* 
0.59* 
0.53* 
0.61* 
0.69* 
-0.25 
-1.52* 
-0.99* 
0.75* 
-0.08 
-1.30* 
1.34* 
0.26 
-0.10 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.10* 
7.28* 
-1.15* 
0.00 
-0.25* 
0.02* 
0.45 
0.06 
-0.14 
n.a. 
-0.17 
-0.26 
0.38* 
0.69* 
-0.41* 
0.02 
0.51* 
-0.46* 
-0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.10* 
-0.08* 
0.06* 
-7.23* 
0.14 
-0.32* 
0.01 
0.27 
0.21 
0.04 
0.23 
0.11 
-0.13 
0.19 
0.10 
-0.19 
0.01 
0.72* 
-0.30 
0.10 
0.08* 
0.05 
0.06 
0.04* 
Table 7A.4 (continued) 
B. Out-of-State Tuition and Nonresident Enrollment Share 
Endogenous variables 
Log in-state tuition (TUITI) 
Log out-of-state tuition (TUITO) 
Log nonresident enrollment share (NON) 
State demographics/institutional characteristics 
Log unemployment (UNEMP) 
Share of population aged 18-24 (AGE) 
Share of population with incomes below max Pell 
allowable (ELIG) 
Log number of governing boards (GOV) 
Sources of institutional aid 
Log state appropriations per student (APP) 
Log endowment per student (END) 
Sources of student financial aid 
Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL) 
Percent cap on costs (CAP) 
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979) 
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992) 
Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) 
Florida Merit Program (MERIT) 
Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) 
Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT) 
New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) 
Enrollment pressure 
Ratio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) 
Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 
Log regional composite tuition (TUITR) 
Log share of FTE undergrads in reciprocity 
agreements (RECIP) 
School and student quality/competitive position 
Poor Barron's rank (LOWB) 
Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB) 
Institution's share of quality public seats in the state 
(BSPUB) 
Institution's share of quality private seats in the state 
(BSPRIV) 
Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 
Lot SAT (SAT) 
Adjusted R2 
Out-of-State 
Tuition 
Cross 
Section 
(5) 
Panel 
6) 
Nonresident 
Share 
Cross 
Section 
(7) 
ll t Equations 
0.49* 
-0.03 
0.01 
-1.25 
-0.69* 
0.00* 
-0.05 
0.04* 
-0.09 
-0.18 
-0.14 
-0.04 
-0.06 
-0.30* 
0.12 
-0.04* 
0.14* 
0.11* 
0.90* 
-0.06 
-0.08* 
1.13 
0.05 
0.00 
0.02* 
0.02 
-0.02 
-0.07 
0.09 
0.05 
0.04 
0.04 
0.02 
-0.02 
0.07* 
-1.49* 
-0.33* 
3.12 
0.59 
-0.02* 
-1.30* 
0.21* 
-0.12 
0.16 
-0.11 
-1.34* 
-0.14 
0.06 
0.30 
-0.08 
-0.11 
0.34* 
Panel 
(8) 
-0.26 
-0.17* 
4.57 
-0.54 
-0.01 
0.03 
-0.27 
-0.02 
-0.43 
-1.16* 
-0.44* 
0.19 
0.18 
-0.10 
-0.29 
0.37* 
-0.10* 
0.07* 
-0.03 
0.00 
0.02 
0.04 
-0.07* 
-0.41* 
-0.08 
1.06* 
0.05 
0.02 
0.11 
0.29* 
0.00 
0.19* 
0.00 
-0.14* 
0.02* 
0.72* 
-1.21* 
0.00 
-0.59: 
0.21 
0.865 0.933 0.374 0.203 
Notes: The efficiency of a system such as ours can be improved if one accounts for the correlation among 
the error terms in each equation. 3SLS estimates were largely similar to the 2SLS estimates, but are not 
reported here due to concern that one or more of the equations in the system are misspecified, which can 
effect estimates in other equations (Johnston and DiNardo 1997). FTE = full-time equivalent. FTEFTF 
= full-time equivalent first-time freshmen. 
*Significant at the 95 percent level. 
Table 7A.5 Reduced-Form Regression Results Including Grant Aid as Explanatory Variable 
Grant Aid In-State Tuition 
Variable 
Cross 
Section 
(1) 
Panel 
(2) 
Cross 
Section 
(3) 
Panel 
(4) 
A. State Need-Based Grant Aid and In 
State demographics/institutional characteristics 
Log tax revenues per capita (TAX) 
Log unemployment (UNEMP) 
Share of population aged 18-24 (AGE) 
Share of population with incomes below maximum Pell 
allowable (ELIG) 
Log number of governing boards (GOV) 
Sources of institutional aid 
Log state appropriations per student (APP) 
Log endowment per student (END) 
Sources of student financial aid 
Log need-based grant aid per public student (AID) 
Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL) 
Percent cap in costs (CAP) 
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979) 
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992) 
Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) 
Florida Merit Program (MERIT) 
Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) 
Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT) 
New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) 
Enrollment pressure 
Ratio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) 
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 
Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) 
Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 
Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 
School quality/competitive position 
Weak Barron's rank (LOWB) 
Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB) 
Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 
Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 
Adjusted R2 
-State Tuition Equations 
0.57* 
0.34* 
-23.38* 
-0.07 
0.01 
-0.27* 
0.02 
n.a. 
-10.70 
-3.50 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1.01* 
-0.82 
-1.77* 
-1.90* 
0.69 
0.14* 
1.36* 
0.63* 
-0.87* 
0.27* 
0.04 
-0.01 
0.32* 
0.30* 
0.20* 
0.04 
-13.49* 
1.14* 
n.a. 
0.53* 
0.01 
n.a. 
1.32* 
0.70* 
0.57* 
0.73* 
0.77* 
-0.30 
-1.55* 
-1.01* 
0.73* 
-0.09 
-1.14* 
1.32* 
0.31* 
-0.08 
0.03 
-0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.04 
0.16* 
2.10 
-1.17* 
0.00 
-0.21* 
0.02* 
0.08* 
-1.18 
-0.47 
0.01 
n.a. 
-0.04 
-0.40 
0.01 
0.35* 
-0.27 
0.03* 
0.76* 
-0.39* 
-0.15* 
0.10* 
-0.01 
0.10* 
-0.02 
0.03 
0.04 
0.08* 
-9.04* 
0.37 
n.a. 
-0.19* 
0.01 
0.02 
0.44* 
0.32* 
0.13* 
0.36* 
0.22* 
-0.18* 
-0.07 
-0.07 
-0.09 
-0.01 
0.55* 
-0.10 
0.15* 
0.06* 
0.05* 
0.06* 
0.04* 
0.01 
0.595 0.618 0.737 0.866 
Table 7A.5 (continued) 
State demographics/institutional characteristics 
Log tax revenues per capita (TAX) 
Log unemployment (UNEMP) 
Share of population aged 18-24 (AGE) 
Share of population with incomes below maximum Pell 
allowable (ELIG) 
Number of governing boards (GOV) 
Sources of institutional aid 
Log state appropriations per student (APP) 
Log endowment per student (END) 
Sources of student financial aid 
Log need-based grant aid per public student (AID) 
Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL) 
Percent cap on costs (CAP) 
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979) 
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992) 
Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) 
Florida Merit Program (MERIT) 
Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) 
Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT) 
New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) 
Enrollment pressure 
Ratio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) 
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 
Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) 
Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 
Log composite regional tuition (TUITR) 
Log share of FTE undergrads in reciprocity agreements 
(RECIP) -0.01 0.00 -0.08* 0.06 
School and student quality/competitive position 
Weak Barron's rank (LOWB) 
Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB) 
Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 
Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 
Institution's share of quality public seats in the state 
(BSPUB) 0.01 -0.04 1.27* 0.29* 
Institution's share of quality private seats in the state 
(BSPRIV) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.32* -0.11 0.08 -0.57* 
Lot SAT (SAT) -0.12 2.12* -0.86 -0.14 
Adjusted R2 0.802 0.904 0.508 0.205 
Notes: FTE = full-time equivalent. FTEFTF = full-time equivalent first-time freshmen, n.a. = not ap-
plicable. 
*Significant at the 95 percent level. 
Out-of-State 
Tuition 
Cross 
Section 
(5) 
Panel 
(6) 
Nonresident 
Share 
Cross 
Section 
(7) 
ollment Share Equations 
-0.04 
0.11* 
-0.06 
-1.26* 
-0.01 
-0.14* 
0.04* 
0.06* 
0.22 
-0.25 
-0.08 
n.a. 
-0.12 
-0.24* 
-0.03 
-0.18 
-0.06 
-0.01 
0.11 
-0.13* 
0.07* 
0.14* 
0.08* 
0.05* 
-4.06* 
0.58* 
n.a. 
-0.24* 
0.01* 
0.01 
0.13 
-0.18* 
0.04 
0.45* 
0.17 
-0.02 
-0.05 
-0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.20 
0.07 
0.16* 
0.10* 
-0.21 
-0.30* 
8.11 
1.27 
-0.16 
-1.17* 
0.16* 
-0.09* 
4.15 
1.25 
-0.02 
n.a. 
0.28 
-1.39* 
-0.44 
0.23 
0.40 
-0.02 
0.40 
-0.38 
-0.35* 
0.10 
Panel 
(8) 
-0.21* 
-0.16* 
4.04 
-1.13 
n.a. 
0.07 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.08 
-0.52* 
-0.83* 
-0.46 
-1.18* 
-0.42* 
0.25 
0.15 
-0.10 
-0.62 
0.20 
-0.29* 
0.35* 
n.a. 
0.04 
0.02 
0.06* 
n.a. 
0.00 
0.05* 
0.03 
n.a. 
-0.20 
-0.26* 
0.31* 
n.a. 
0.11 
0.04 
-0.03 
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